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ISSUE-DIMENSIONS AND PARTY STRATEGIES IN THE IRISH REPUBLIC, 1948 - 1981 THE EVIDENCE OF MANIFESTOS

by

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Prefatory Note

This is the first draft of a report of an analysis of the content of Irish party manifestos and programmes from 1948 to 1981, a shorter version of which will be published in Ian Budge and David Robertson (eds), Party Strategy (London & Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984). Comments on the analysis and suggestions for improvements will be very welcome.

I would also like to acknowledge the financial support of the Nuffield Foundation, which facilitated research on this paper.

I. INTRODUCTION: THE ISSUE-DIMENSIONS IN POST-WAR IRISH POLITICS

This paper sets out to identify the main issue dimensions in the post-war politics of the Irish Republic and to then locate the positions of the major political parties along those dimensions. The data on which the analysis is based are the programmes and manifestos issued by these parties - Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour - in the ten general elections held between 1948 and 1981. These programmes were coded according to a scheme originally devised by David Robertson (1976) to analyse British party manifestos, and subsequently modified by members of an ECPR research group in order to apply it to the election literature of some twenty different democracies including, in this case, the Irish Republic in the post-war period. The categories used in this coding scheme are shown in table 1.

(Table 1 about here)

Ideally, in an analysis such as this, one would hope to be able to identify a number of different dimensions, each of which would make immediate substantive sense. Such would be the case, for instance, if the analysis pointed to the presence of a major left-right dimension or, in the Irish case, to some form of nationalist dimension. At the same time, ideally one would find that, over time, the various parties retained reasonably fixed or consistent positions along these dimensions. Alternatively, if the parties' positions did change, one could ideally explain this change in terms of other knowledge about the party system or through theories of party competition in general.

Such would be the ideal result of this type of analysis. In practice, however, it might happen that issue dimensions derived from an analysis of party programmes seem to bear little relation to what is normally seen to be the political reality of the country concerned. Alternatively one might

Table 1: Categories used in the Coding of Irish Manifestoes.

Categories	DOMAIN 1: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
101	Foreign Special Relationships: Positive Favourable mention to countries particularly involved with the relevant country. In the Irish case, this refers only to Britain.
102	Foreign Special Relationships: Negative In the Irish case this is taken to involve statements in favour of Irish unity and of the severing of the link between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom.
103	Decolonisation Favourable mentions of decolonisation, need for US/UK etc. to leave colonies, greater self government, and independance, need to train natives for this, need to give special aid to make up for colonial past.
104	Military: Positive Need for strong military presence overseas, for re-armament and self-defence, need to keep to military treaty obligations, need to secure adequate manpower in military.
105	Military: Negative
106	Peace Declaration of belief in Peace and peaceful means of solving crises. Need for disarmament and negotiations with hostile countries.
107	Internationalism: Positive Support for UN, need for international cooperation, need for aid to developing countries, need for world planning of resources, need for international courts, support for any international aim or world state.
108	Internationalism: Positive Vis à vis EEC and Europe

Table 1 continued

Categories

109 Internationalism: Negative

110 Internationalism: Negative via à vis EEC and Europe.

DOMAIN 2: FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY

201 Freedom and Domestic Human Rights
Favourable mentions of importance of personal freedom, civil rights, freedom of choice in education, freedom from bureaucratic control, freedom of speech, freedom from coercion in industrial and political sphere, individualism.

202 Democracy
Favourable mention of democracy as method or goal in national and other organisations, support for worker participation, for involvement of all citizens in decision making, as well as generalized support for symbols of democracy.

203 Constitutionalism: Positive
Support for specified aspects of a formal constitution, use of constitutionalism as an argument for policy as well as generalised approval for 'constitutional' way of doing things.

204 Constitutionalism: Negative

DOMAIN 3: GOVERNMENT

301 Decentralisation: Positive
Support for devolution, regional administration on politics or economy, support for keeping up local and regional customs and symbols, deference to local expertise in planning etc.

302 Decentralisation: Negative

303 Government Efficiency
Need for efficiency in government (eg merit system in civil service), economy in government, cutting down civil service, improving governmental procedures, general appeal to make process of government and administration cheaper and more effective.

Table 1 continued

Categories

304 Government Corruption
Need to eliminate corruption in government, and associated abuse, eg regulation of campaign expenses, need to check pandering to selfish interests.

305 Government Effectiveness and Authority
Includes references to government stability.

DOMAIN 4: ECONOMY

401 Enterprise
Favourable mention of private property rights, personal enterprise and initiative, need for unhampered individual enterprises; favourable mention of free enterprise capitalism, superiority of individual enterprise over state, and over state buying or management systems.

402 Incentives
Need for financial and other incentives and for opportunities for the young etc, encouragement to small businesses and one-man shops, need for wage and tax policies designed to induce enterprise, Home Ownership.

403 Regulation of Capitalism
Need for regulations designed to make private enterprise work better; actions against monopolies and trusts and in defense of consumer and small businessmen; anti-profiteering.

404 Economic Planning
Favourable mention of central planning, of consultative or indicative nature, need for this and for government department to create national plan, need to plan imports and exports.

405 Corporatism
(Special subcategory where needed, especially Canada, Netherlands.)

406 Protectionism: Positive
Favourable mention of extension or maintenance of tariffs to protect internal markets, or other domestic economic protectionism.

Table 1 continued.

Categories

407 Protectionism: Negative

408 Economic Goals, Policy non-specific
General statements of intent to pursue any economic goals that are policy non-specific.

409 Keynsian Demand Management
Adjusting government expenditure to prevailing levels of employment and inflation.

410 Productivity
Need to encourage or facilitate greater production, need to take measures to aid this, appeal for greater production, and importance of productivity to the economy, increase foreign trade, special aid to specific sectors of the economy, growth, active manpower policy, aid to agriculture, tourism and industry.

411 Technology and Infrastructure
Importance of modernising industrial administration, importance of science and technological developments in industry, need for training and government sponsored research, need for overhaul of capital equipment, and methods of communications and transport (including Merchant Marine), development of Nuclear Engergy.

412 Controlled Economy
General need for direct government control of economy, control over prices, wages, rents, etc. This covers NEITHER Nationalisation, nor Indicative planning.

413 Nationalisation
Government ownership and control, partial or complete, including government ownership of land.

414 Economic Orthodoxy and Efficiency
Need for traditional economic orthodoxy, eg, balanced budget, retrenchment in crisis, low taxation, thrift and savings, support for traditional economic institutions like the Stock Market and banking system, support for strong currency internationally.

Table 1 continued.

Categories	DOMAIN 5: WELFARE AND QUALITY OF LIFE
501	Environmental Protection Preservation of countryside, forests etc, general preservation of natural resources against selfish interests, proper use of national parks, soil banks etc.
502	Art, Sport, Leisure, and Media Favourable mention of leisure activities, need to spend money on museums, art galleries etc., need to encourage worthwhile leisure activities, and to provide cultural and leisure facilities, to encourage development of the media, etc.
503	Social Justice Need for fair treatment of all, for special protection for exploited, fair treatment in tax system, need for equality of opportunity, need for fair distribution of resources and removal of class barriers, end of discrimination.
504	Social Services Expansion: Positive Favourable mention of need to maintain or expand any basic service or welfare scheme, and support for free basic social services such as public health, or housing. THIS EXCLUDES EDUCATION.
505	Social Services Expansion: Negative
506	Education: Pro-Expansion
507	Education: Anti-Expansion
	DOMAIN 6: FABRIC OF SOCIETY
601	Defence of National Way of Life: Positive Favourable mentions of importance of defence against subversion, necessary suspension of some freedoms in order to defend this, support of national ideas, traditions and institutions.
602	Defence of National Way of Life: Negative

Table 1 continued.

Categories

603 Traditional Morality: Positive
Favourable mention of, eg, censorship, supression of immorality and unseemly behaviour, maintenance and stability of family.

604 Traditional Morality: Negative

605 Law and Order
Enforcement of all laws, actions against organised crime and terrorism, putting down urban violence, support and resources for police, tougher attitutdes in courts etc.

606 National Effort/Social Harmony
Appeal for national effort and solidarity, need for nation to see itself as united, appeal for public spiritedness, decrying anti-social attitudes in a time of crisis, support for public interest, national interest, bipartisanship.

607 Communalism, Pluralism, Pillarization: Positive
Preservation of autonomy of religious, ethnic, linguistic heritages within the country.

608 Communalism, Pluralism, Pillarization: Negative

DOMAIN 7: SOCIAL GROUPS

701 Labour Groups
Favourable references to Labour, working class, unemployed poor, support for Labour Unions, free collective bargaining, good treatment of manual and other employees.

702 Agriculture and Farmers
Support for agriculture, farmers, any policy aimed specifically at benefitting these.

703 Other Economic Groups

704 Underpriviledged Minority Groups

705 Non-Economic Demographic Groups
eg, women, young people.

find that the party positions changed almost at random from one election to the next, as might be the case in a system dominated by parties which placed no premium on questions of policy or ideology per se, but which, motivated only by a desire for office, subordinated everything to the need to maximise their electoral appeal. Finally, it could even be the case that the issue dimensions themselves changed substantially over time, and that those derived from a study of elections in the early part of a given period would differ significantly from those derived from a study of the latter part of the period, while both could in turn differ from those dimensions derived, as in this case, from the period taken as a whole.

In the Irish case, it is the first of these problems which would appear at first sight to present the most difficulty; despite the generally held view of the Irish party system as one dominated by a nationalist cleavage (see below), nationalist rhetoric as such appears to play a very minimal role in the programmes of the various parties: as can be seen in table 2, the category which covers statements in favour of Irish unity (102) accounts for only 2 per cent of sentences in Irish manifestos. The case of Fianna Fail is of particular interest here, since it is the party which is generally reckoned to gain the most from appeals to nationalist sentiment; yet, taking the post-war period as a whole, we find that only 2.1 per cent of sentences in the party programmes specify support for Irish unity, and the topic barely registers in those programmes from the earlier part of the period (1948-1961). The category of traditional morality (603), which arguably may also express a facet of nationalist ideology, again counts for a negligible proportion of the party's statements, averaging only 0.1 per cent for the post-war period as a whole. Indeed, the only category which does register reasonably highly within Fianna Fail programmes, and which may at the same time be

considered as part of some general appeal to nationalism, is that of national effort and social harmony (606), a category which covers appeals to voters to act in the national interest and in a way which reinforces national solidarity. But here the appeal is to Irish unity in social rather than territorial terms.

The relative absence of explicit appeals to nationalism is particularly surprising given what are identified in the literature as being the main cleavages in contemporary Irish politics. The most recent - and largely intuitive - attempt to specify these cleavages suggests that the primary conflict is that of 'strong vs. weak' nationalism, with 'planned vs. market economy' as the second major dimension (Cohan 1982, p. 269). In a similar vein, Basil Chubb's pioneering study of Irish politics identified a version of the nationalist cleavage as the dominant opposition, with secondary cleavages being expressed in terms of left vs. right and town vs. country (Chubb 1971, pp. 58-60). Yet another study, this time based on a survey of the attitudes of party activists in a Dublin constituency in the early 1970s, found that a 'territorial nationalism' dimension explained a substantial proportion of the variation in responses, though this time the dominant dimension was one identified as 'pluralism/clericalism'. A third, less significant dimension, 'anti-capitalist radicalism', was also identified, and can be seen as a version of 'left vs. right' (Garvin 1974, pp. 321-322). But it should also be noted that in this case the attitude questions were formulated on the basis of six hypothesised issue areas which were themselves biased towards a nationalism-emphasising interpretation of Irish political cleavages. These issue-areas were Law and Order/IRA; Cultural Nationalism; Sexual Puritanism; Anti-secularism; Territorial Nationalism, and Economic Liberalism (Garvin 1974, p. 321, and Garvin 1977b).

In general, therefore, there appears to be substantial agreement that the main cleavage in Irish politics is one based on nationalism, while the more conventional left-right opposition finds expression only as a secondary conflict. In terms of party politics, the main cleavage is seen to divide the two largest parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, while Labour opposes both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael along the secondary, left-right dimension. But if this is the case, why should there be so little explicit reference to nationalist appeals in Irish party programmes?

One possible explanation could be sought in the nature of the party programmes themselves. Manifestos and surrogates such as party leaders' speeches, radio broadcasts and so on, can be seen as expressions of reasonably short-term policies. They represent the views of the parties as to what should be done in the four- to five-year lifetime of the next Dáil (i.e. parliament). Nationalist appeals, on the other hand, are of a more long-term character in Ireland, in that they express essentially timeless aspirations to 'eventual' national unity, a dim and distant prospect which few Irish politicians would even envisage occuring in their lifetimes. As such, there is really little to be said about it, even, or perhaps especially, in manifestos and election statements.

A related explanation would be that explicit nationalist appeals play little role in party programmes simply because such appeals are almost inevitably devoid of policy content. Short of sponsoring a campaign of violence against the majority in Northern Ireland, there is little any of the parties can do to actually advance the cause of unity in any practical way. Commitment to unity ultimately remains an aspiration, however widely felt or intense it may be, and the expression of that commitment inevitably remains largely rhetorical. To be sure, the recrudescence of violence in Ulster at the end of the 1960s vastly increased the salience of the issue of Irish unity in the Republic, and certainly the prospects of some form of

constitutional change appeared much were likely. But if it then seemed more plausible to speak of the creation of a 32-county Republic within a matter of decades rather than of generations - and hence the increased space devoted by Fianna Fail to statements in favour of unity in the 1965-81 period as against the 1948-61 period (see table 2) - the manifesto rhetoric remained just rhetoric. There was little to promise voters beyond simply a willingness to reassert the commitment to justice in Northern Ireland itself, and the eventual territorial unity of the island as a whole. In 1977, for instance, Fianna Fail were content to emphasise that a central aim of the party 'is to secure by peaceful means, the unity and idependence of Ireland as a democratic Republic. We totally reject the use of force as a means of achieving this aim. Any progress on the lines suggested in Fianna Fail's policy statement on the North, published in 1975, would add greatly to the impact of our economic strategy by promoting confidence both North and South and facilitating a return to a normal economic and tourist environment' (1977 Manifesto, p. 44). Even by the relative standards of conventional party programmes, such a statement is striking in its sheer blandness. Nor is it a statement which would have been a point of contention with the other parties. This was the era of bipartisanship on Northern Ireland, and even if one of the parties could have developed a specific policy content to accord with the traditional aspiration to unity, it is unlikely that its opponents would have found in that policy a possible source of convention. Nor was Northern Ireland a major issue in the minds of the voters: despite the seriousness of the conflict, the post-1968 violence had tended to remain north of the border, and Irish voters preferred to worry about inflation and unemployment (Rose et al 1978, p. 36). More recently, as a somewhat demoralised Fianna Fail under the leadership of Charles Haughey confronts an increasingly optimistic

Fine Gael led by Garret Fitzgerald, the Republic's policy towards the North has become a reasonably serious point of contention between the parties. But this is a phenomenon of the 1982 elections, particularly that of November 1982, and it falls outside the current scope of this particular analysis.

The long-term character of the issue, and its largely rhetorical nature therefore afford two possible explanations for the absence of explicit nationalist appeals in Irish party programmes. To these could be added a further explanation based on the very consensual nature of the unity issue - at least until very recently. All three parties pledge themselves in favour of Irish unity as a basic political principle to the extent that this commitment is reflected even in the full titles of Fianna Fail (viz Fianna Fail - the Republican Party) and Fine Gael (viz Fine Gael - the United Ireland Party). The Republic's claim to territorial jurisdiction over Northern Ireland is also enshrined in articles 2 and 3 of Bunreacht na hEireann, the Irish constitution. The nationalist appeal is in this sense a given, an accepted piece of political wisdom as entrenched as the commitment to parliamentary democracy itself. And to this extent that it is a given, the parties can take such an appeal for granted, hardly needing to concern themselves with a repeated stressing of the national aspiration. Fine Gael is perhaps somewhat of an exception here: as the successor of Cumann na nGaedheal, the party which accepted the 1921 Treaty with Britain and Dominion Status within the British Commonwealth; and as the party which contained a significant body of opinion hostile to Ireland's neutrality during World War II, Fine Gael has always been seen to be slightly suspect on the national question. Hence, I feel, the relative stress which the party has laid on statements supportive of Irish unity in its election programmes. Conversely Fianna Fail, and also Labour to an extent, could more easily take for granted that voter were aware of their pro-unity position. Pro-unity

statements barely figure in the 1948-61 Fianna Fail and Labour programmes, yet register an average of almost 4 per cent in Fine Gael programmes (cf table 2). It is thus interesting to note that Fine Gael, traditionally regarded in Ireland as the 'softest' party on the national question, is at the same time the party which records the highest proportion of references to Irish unity in the period as a whole.

This, and the other points which have been advanced to explain the relative lack of emphasis on explicit nationalist appeals in Irish party programmes, may seem an overly lengthy exposition of what might appear to non-Irish readers as a fairly minor point. Yet at the same time it does indicate a very crucial aspect of manifestos as guides to party ideology, insofar as we can suggest that (a) because an issue lacks a specific policy application; or (b) because the consensus on the issue is so widespread; or (c) because support for the issue is so ingrained that it can be taken for granted, significant components of a party's ideology may rarely find expression in the cold print of election programmes. These are more general points which should be borne in mind concerning the usefulness of employing election programmes as sources for the study of party ideology. At the same time, however, in the Irish case, the absence from party programmes of an issue considered by many to be of crucial importance, may have an alternative and indeed much simpler explanation, i.e. <u>that appeals to nationalism have played an insignificant role in electoral mobilisation in post-war Ireland</u>. However important such appeals might seem when one sets out to define the <u>historical</u> differences between the parties, their absence from the election programmes suggests that these appeals are no longer relevant to <u>contemporary</u> political alignments. If this is the case, then it is mistaken to assert that one still finds in the nationalist domain the basis for the major political opposition in Ireland.

The nationalist explanation is maintained, however, due to the persistence of the view that the main political opposition in post-war Ireland has been that of Fianna Fail vs. Fine Gael. If party competition in post-war Ireland is seen in these terms, then one is almost inevitably drawn towards an explanation which emphasises intra-nationalist divisions as the basis of the division; there is simply little else ofsubstance with which to distinguish these two essentially conservative parties. If, on the other hand, and as argued elsewhere (Mair 1979), the primary opposition is seen to be Fianna Fail vs. all other parties, including both Fine Gael and Labour, then the nationalist explanation makes less substantive sense. While Fianna Fail may be in a position to play the green card when confronting Fine Gael on its own, it can do so with much less plausibility when confronting the combined, coalitional opposition of Fine Gael, Labour and other minor parties. And if this latter confrontation is taken as the primary opposition in post-war Ireland, then we must seek an alternative issue-basis for party competition. One such alternative has already been hypothesised in terms of an opposition based on 'ability to govern' (Mair 1979), an opposition which finds expression in Fianna Fail's stress on the need for stable, single-party government (to be provided by Fianna Fail) as against the uncertainties of coalition (which Fianna Fail sees as the inevitable alternative to its own governance).

To conclude this section, we are therefore hypothesising that the main issue-dimension in post-war Irish politics is based on 'ability to govern', rather than on any persisting intra-nationalist conflict. At the same time, and this time in accordance with the prevailing literature, it is also suggested that a secondary issue-dimension derives from a version of the traditional left-right cleavage. In terms of party alignments, we should expect to find that the first of these dimensions divides Fianna Fail from both Fine Gael and Labour, while the second should divide Fine Gael and Labour themselves, with Fianna Fail occupying a position roughly in the centre.

II. THE PARTY SYSTEM AND THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

1. The Party System

Much of the relevant information on the Irish party system will be already apparent from the introductory section above. This section will therefore provide only a very brief outline, before going on to discuss - also briefly - the relevant characteristics of the governmental system. It should also be noted that there now exists quite a substantial literature on the Irish party system which can be easily consulted by readers (e.g. Carty 1981; Chubb 1969 & 1979; Gallagher 1976 & 1981; Garvin 1974,1977a & 1981a; Mair 1979; Manning 1972; O'Leary 1979; Rumpf and Hepburn 1977, and Whyte 1974).

As indicated above, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael - the two largest parties - owe their origins to Sinn Fein, the success of which in the 1918 Westminster election, and in subsequently establishing an alternative to the British regime, led to Irish independence. Party competition in the inter-war years was dominated by these two parties, Cumann na nGaedheal (later Fine Gael) holding office until 1932 when it was replaced by Fianna Fail. Though the details need not concern us here, the period of the late 1920s and early 1930s saw a rapid polarisation of the party system, as smaller parties such as Labour and the Farmers Party lost votes to both Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fail. From 1933 onwards, however, Cumann na nGaedheal/Fine Gael itself began to lose support, such that by 1948 - the beginning of the period considered in this paper - the relative importance of the two larger parties had changed significantly. From being (semi) equivalent opponents in the late 1920s and early 1930s, by 1948 Fianna Fail had established a clear electoral superiority over Fine Gael. Significantly, when Fianna Fail lost office in 1948 - for the first time in sixteen years - the new government was

an inter-party coalition. Not since 1932 has another single party in Irish politics been in a position to replace Fianna Fail unaided by other parties (but this situation may now finally be changing). By 1948 we can see the effective institutionalisation of the new opposition setting Fianna Fail versus 'the Rest'. In short, we see the institutional confirmation of the emergence of a predominant party system (Mair 1979).

The Irish party system has remained relatively stable in the post-war period. The two minor parties which had risen during the 1940s, Clann na Talmhan and Clann na Poblachta, declined as quickly in the aftermath of the first coalition (in fact, Clann na Talmhan's high point was reached in the 1944 election with 10 per cent of the vote; in 1948 it declined to 5 per cent), while the coalition experience proved sufficient to set Fine Gael on the road to electoral recovery. In 1951 Fine Gael's vote rose to 26 per cent, and to 32 per cent in 1954. Though declining to 27 per cent in 1957, it increased again to 32 per cent in 1961 and to almost 37 per cent in 1981, the last election treated in this analysis. The vote won by Labour - the third party in the system - remained relatively stable in the period from 1948 to 1961, despite a brief decline in the 1957 election. After 1961, however, the party experienced a steady growth, particularly in the Dublin region: in 1965 Labour won 15 per cent of the vote (19 per cent in Dublin) as against only 12 per cent in 1961 (10 per cent in Dublin), and 9 per cent in 1957 (8 per cent in Dublin). In 1969, the Labour vote reached 19 per cent, of which the Dublin proportion reached a record 28 per cent. Since then, however, the party was declined. A similar pattern of decline is shown by the minor parties and Independents, the total vote for which has not exceeded 10 per cent since 1957. Fianna Fail has remained particularly stable during the post-war period, with an average vote of 46 per cent.

Given the stability of the largest party, it is not surprising to find that the pattern of opposition has remained essentially unchanged since 1948. At that election, Fianna Fail was replaced by a coalition government which received the support of all the other parties in the Dail, and, on the three subsequent occasions when Fianna Fail was defeated in 1954, 1973 and 1981, it was again replaced by coalitions receiving the support of all other Dail parties. The only variation in this pattern has been the changing composition and balance of the non-Fianna Fail group, which now consists of only two parties - Fine Gael and Labour. Whereas other non-Fianna Fail parties and Independents won 27 per cent of the vote in 1948, this figure had dropped to only seven per cent in 1977, with a corresponding change in the Rae fractionalsation index from 0.75 to 0.65. Despite pursuing go-it-alone strategies in the post-1957 period, Labour and Fine Gael found themselves again reverting to a coalition strategy in 1973 in an effort to defeat Fianna Fail. That election saw a slight increase in the Fianna Fail vote, but the effective intra-coalition transfer strategy of Fine Gael and Labour was sufficient to ensure a change of government for the first time in 16 years (Cohan et al, 1975). The coalition was itself defeated in the 1977 election when Fianna Fail was unexpectedly returned to power with an absolute majority of seats, while the coalition was returned as a minority government in 1981.

2. The Governmental System

The Irish governmental system is largely similar to that of the UK, and is characterised by cabinet government and a bicameral legislature in which most of the power rests with the lower house - the Dáil. The two systems do differ to the extent that Ireland has a written constitution; a proportional electoral system with multi member constituencies; an upper house - the senate - which is a primarily elected assembly (11 of the 60 seats are filled by appointees of the Taoiseach, i.e. prime minister) and which has a very restricted electorate organised in vocational and university panels; and an elective Head of State, the President, who in practice has very limited powers (Chubb 1971).

On a more informal basis, the most striking features of the Irish governmental system are the strength of the Cabinet (the executive) vis a vis the Dáil (the lower house of the legislature), a very limited committee system and, in a related way, the tendency for individual TDs (i.e. MPs) to concern themselves with local constituency politics rather than national affairs, all of which combine to create a situation in which the Cabinet has a virtual monopoly in the introduction and passage of legislation (Chubb 1974). Despite the fact that four of the ten governments elected in the period between 1948 and 1981 have been in minority positions, while a fifth (elected in 1965) has controlled just exactly 50 per cent of Dail seats, on only two occasions has a government been forced to resign as the result of a Dail defeat. Both of these occasions concern the most recent governments, a Fine Gael-Labour minority coalition defeated on its budget proposals in January 1982, and a Fianna Fail minority government defeated in a vote of confidence in November 1982. With the exception of these two short-lived governments, the average duration in office of post-war governments has been three years and nine months.

Post-war Irish government has been dominated by Fianna Fail - which formed single - party administrations after six of the ten elections between 1948 and 1981 (average duration of

three years and ten months). The non-Fianna Fail governments have been Fine Gael-led coalitions, together with Labour, Clann na Talmhan and Clann na Poblachta in 1948 and 1954, and simply with Labour in 1973 and 1981 (average duration of two years and nine months). In terms of government formation, therefore, Ireland has been characterised by two very clear alternatives in the period under consideration: single party Fianna Fail government or coalitions involving all Dail parties other than Fianna Fail.

An earlier perusal of election advertisements and major election speeches suggests that much of party propaganda has been oriented around this Fianna Fail vs the Rest opposition (Mair 1979), and hence the earlier hypothesis that the manifestos should reveal a similar type of emphasis. The advertisements and speeches concerned tended to be of the type in which Fianna Fail stressed the need for governmental stability, associated this stability with single-party government, and argued that it itself was the only party which could plausibly be seen to be able to provide such government. The response of the other parties, and particularly of Fine Gael, was often to assert that coalitions were the best form of government, since they were most effective at representing the diversity of Irish political opinion. As noted above, this dimension should become evident in the analysis of manifestos. What is less clear, however, is whether any other evidence might appear which would predict the Fine Gael-Labour coalition strategy. On the face of it, it seems unlikely that such an alignment would be predicted by positions on the hypothesised, but secondary, left-right dimension: in terms of their traditional policies and their social bases of support, it hardly seems plausible to imagine that left-right placings would situate both Fine Gael and Labour on the same side of Fianna Fail On the contrary, the conclusions of the literature on Irish politics, as well as the more objective evidence of opinion surveys would suggest that the left-right dimension is the one most likely to divide Fine Gael and Labour, placing Fianna Fail in the centre vis a vis its two opponents. But this is

to pre-empt the evidence of the manifestos, which may indeed show a left-right Fine Gael-Labour alignment; or, alternatively, an alignment on the basis of an issue dimension wholly different from those hypothesised above.

The final point in this section concerns the specific effects of the electoral system on political competition. Irish elections are conducted with a type of proportional representation known as the Single Transferable Vote (STV), in which voters rank candidates nominated in multi-member constituencies on a 1, 2, 3 ....N basis. While the details of STV need not concern us here (but see O'Leary 1979; Mair 1982), nevertheless certain aspects are worth noting and have a bearing on any discussion of party manifestos. Of particular relevance is the tendency for the larger parties to nominate in any one constituency more candidates than they can hope to win seats. For a variety of reasons, a party which can hope to win only two seats in a four-seat constituency will nevertheless often nominate three or four candidates, with the result that the most intense electoral competition frequently takes place at intra- rather than at inter-party level; thus if Fianna Fail, for instance, is fairly well assured of winning two and only two seats in, say, constituency X, and yet nominates three candidates, then the most intense competition may be that which occurs between these three candidates over which two of the three actually gets to the Dáil. None of the three may be inclined to compete directly with the Fine Gael candidates, since in this case it would be fairly certain that Fianna Fail could not gain an extra seat from that party, or lose one of its two assured seats.

To the extent that such intra-party rivalry dominates elections at the local level, then to that extent the manifesto or party programme is unimportant. Despite the recent emergence of pro- and anti-Haughey (the current party leader) wings in Fianna Fail (Garvin 1981b),there is no evidence to suggest that intra-party rivalries in that party or in Fine Gael are

organised in terms of ideological or programmatic factions; policy as such plays no role in intra-party competition. Rather, individual candidates compete with their fellow party nominees on the basis of their relative capacity to serve the constituency in a purely administrative sense. Thus the particular policy of the party, while perhaps determining to some extent the degree of national swing between it and its opponent(s), will in many cases be much less influential in determining the fortunes of a particular candidate than would be his or her ability to act as a broker of the individual constituent's interests.

In this sense, individual candidates often pay little attention to overall party policy. Some may not even read the manifestos, and certainly many have no real interest in becoming involved in actually drawing up an electoral programme. The tendency is therefore one of delegation: programmes and their development become the unchallenged property of the senior leadership of the party and national headquarters, while the average candidate or backbench TD will at most acknowledge the receipt of whatever policy emerges, and thereafter put it away in some acceptably dark corner.

III. THE MANIFESTOS

1. Parties included in the analysis

In accordance with the practice adopted by the ECPR Research Group on Party Programmes and Manifestos - of which this particular work is part - the parties which should be included in the analysis are those which count as 'relevant' under the counting rules suggested by Sartori (1976, pp. 121-125). In the Irish case in the period 1948-81, this would include not only Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour, but also Clann na Talmhan and Clann na Poblachta, both of which participated in the first and second inter-party governments in 1948 and 1954.[1] In the following analysis, however, both of these smaller parties have been excluded. In part this is simply due to the difficulties involved in obtaining copies of their programmes, but their exclusion is also justified on the grounds that they faded from the political scene after the defeat of the second inter-party government in 1957.

2. The sources and their format

As can be seen from the bibliography of Irish manifestos (see below pp.93-94) the actual type of document used for this analysis varied substantially from one party to another as well as from one election to another, and as well as formally defined manifestos, the sources used include newspaper articles written by the party leaders, newspaper reports on programmes which were issued but which are now unobtainable, speeches by party leaders, short election addresses, and so on.

Of the three parties considered here, the sources for Labour are clearly the most authoritative. If we treat as formal programmes the articles prepared for the Irish Independent

for the 1948 election, then the sources for Labour over the eight elections which it fought as a separate party include six authoritative statements of policy. Sources for the remaining two elections (1954 and 1961) are newspaper reports. This is particularly unfortunate in the 1961 case, since the very brief newspaper report of Labour's policy refers to the publication of a major 4,000 word election programme. It is not clear whether any formal programme was actually issued in the other case, that of 1954, and the source used here is an Irish Press report of a radio broadcast by Mr. Brendan Corish who later became party leader. In neither case is a manifesto appended to the relevant Annual Report of the party.

The Fine Gael sources include fewer formal statements of policy than do those for Labour. Actual manifestos have been obtained for the years 1961 to 1981 (these include the Fine Gael-Labour joint programmes in 1973 and 1977), and we have also used the Irish Independent article in 1948. For 1951, 1954 and 1957, however, the sources are less reliable, and again it is unclear whether no manifesto was actually issued, or whether the formal documents are now simply unobtainable. Of the three elections in question, the source for 1951 is arguably the least reliable, since it involves simply a four-page election leaflet issued in a particular Dublin constituency, and it is not at all clear to what extent the policies to which it refers are formally approved party policies as against policies drawn up simply for that particular constituency. On the basis of the language and terms used in the leaflet, my own inclination is to believe that it is in fact a reprint of formal party policy. If this is the case, then the only problem may be that it is not comprehensive, and that certain policy areas have been excluded for reasons of space. There is no mention of a policy on agriculture, for instance, which would normally be a surprising omission in a Fine Gael programme, particularly at that time, but which would be a natural policy to neglect

in the context of this urban constituency. The sources for 1954 and 1957 are newspaper reports of speeches by the party leader. In the former case, the speech covers the 'thirteen fundamental principles' of Fine Gael policy and in the latter 'sixteen reasons' why voters should support Fine Gael. Both reports seem to be comprehensive accounts of election policy.

Despite the size and importance of the party, the sources for Fianna Fail are unfortunately very inadequate. Formal statements of policy are available for only three of the ten elections - 1948 (the Irish Independent article), 1977 and 1981. For the bulk of the period, i.e. from 1951 to 1973, we have had to rely on reported speeches, radio broadcasts, and so on. What is particularly unfortunate about this is that it is exactly this period which covers Fianna Fail's most successful years, in that it held government from 1951 to 1954 and from 1957 to 1973. In an analysis of manifestos it is somewhat ironic to report that the most successful party has been the one to make least use of formal election programmes, but more of that later. For the moment, let us look briefly at the actual sources which have been used in lieu of formal manifestos.

The source for Fianna Fail in 1951 is an election leaflet issued for the constituency of West Galway. As in the case of the Dun Laoighaire leaflet used as a Fine Gael source in 1951 (see above), it is not at all clear how much of this document was local work and how much was prepared by national party headquarters and, as in the case of Fine Gael in 1951, it is therefore not clear to what extent these and only these policies were advanced in all parts of the country. The leaflet itself has a preamble which refers to the national situation, as well as two pages reporting Fianna Fail achievements while in office, and promising a continuation of these policies if returned to office in 1951. The 1954 source is more authoritative, being the text of a radio broadcast by Sean Lemass, deputy leader of the party. That for 1957 is also a

reasonably good source, being an almost verbatim account of a major speech on policy, again by Sean Lemass. That of 1961 is the (seemingly) verbatim account of a radio broadcast by Lemass (then party leader), while the source for 1965 is again an almost verbatim speech by Lemass - this time to party workers in Dublin. The 1969 source is less satisfactory since, although it is the speech given by the then party leader (Jack Lynch) to officially open the campaign, it seems to be reported in relatively abbreviated form. Finally, the 1973 source is the least satisfactory of all, comprising simply a short statement given by Jack Lynch on the dissolution of the Dáil. Despite a very time-consuming search, it proved impossible to find any reasonably comprehensive statement of Fianna Fail policy in this election, either in the form of newspaper reports of speeches or of radio or television broadcasts. Somewhere, to be sure, there must exist the text of such a speech; unfortunately, however, I was unable to find it. Given the inadequacy of the 1973 source, therefore, it has been excluded from the factor analysis which is reported later in this paper.

Though the sources therefore vary between parties as well as between elections, nevertheless those chosen for the analysis nearly always do seem to represent comprehensive statements of policy which are arguably as authoritative as can now be found in a country which has a very well developed sense of history but a very poorly developed sense of archives.[2]

Yet when the parties do set about producing a formal manifesto, the results are quite striking. Fianna Fail's first formalised programme since the war - Manifesto: Action Plan for National Reconstruction - published in 1977, is an impressive, A4-sized document of 47 pages, with a cover in the traditional green, white and orange colours. In 1981, the party improved even on this, with a 68-page A4 document which was actually printed rather than cyclostyled, and this time with a glossy

green, white and orange cover, and the type of shiny, expensive pages which one normally associates only with sophisticated magazines. Fine Gael is almost as impressive. While its 1961 manifesto is simply four printed A4 pages, crammed with poorly laid out information, lacking a cover, and graced only by a photograph of the then leader, James Dillon, the 1965 manifesto is extremely professional: this time a printed 30-page A5 pamphlet, it is nicely designed, and clearly so impressed its authors that they decided to take advantage of what they believed would be a heavy demand, and actually charged a shilling a copy. In 1969, the party again issued a pamphlet sized policy (28 pages), this time free of charge, but with a brightly coloured green, white and orange cover. By 1973, however, pressures of time and the need to negotiate hastily with Labour led to a simple, cyclostyled three-page document, distribution of which was left to newspaper coverage. Pressures of time also hindered production of the 1977 Fine Gael-Labour programme - surprisingly in this ase, since they had been in government and were therefore responsible for calling the election - which was not distributed until twenty four hours after that of Fianna Fail. What the two parties did produce therefore showed all the signs of haste: a poorly produced, cyclostyled, 26-page foolscap-sized booklet, full of typographical errors. Things had improved in 1981, however, with the production of a professional, A4 booklet of 31 pages, one marked by a level of detail and precision which is normally most uncharacteristic of even the most professional party propaganda. Since the sources for most of the Labour programmes are various editions of the party's Annual Report, it is impossible to state what form they actually took at the time; given that the party is almost always chronically short of funds, however, it is unlikely that the earlier programmes differed substantially (except perhaps in terms of length) from the only original document included, that of 1981, which was a fairly clearly-typed, A4 sized, 61-page cyclostyled document, albeit with a multi-coloured cover; surprisingly perhaps, the colours chosen were red, white and blue.

3. The role of manifestos

One of the greatest difficulties in applying an analysis such as this to the Irish case is that of determining the role and importance of manifestos and party programmes. Unlike in Britain or even the U.S. (Kavanagh 1981), there is no manifesto 'tradition' and what importance does currently attach to Irish election programmes is largely a product of the 1970s, and the relatively high impact achieved by the coalitions 14-point programme in 1973 (the 'statement of intent') and the now famous Fianna Fail manifesto of 1977. The lack of a traditional emphasis on manifestos derives from a number of factors, most notably the relatively high level of non-policy oriented intra-party competition (see above); the formerly quite prevalent belief that the vast bulk of the electorate had already made up their minds how to vote and that the central problem facing party strategists was partisan mobilisation rather than conversion; and, finally, the lack of an emphasis on manifestos on the part of Fianna Fail, electorally the most successful party in the state.

Yet despite the traditional lack of emphasis on manifestos, commentaries on the post-war Irish party system do tend to identify particular watersheds in terms of the particular party programmes issued at different elections. Three programmes can be seen to be of special significance in this sense - that of Fine Gael in 1965, that of Labour in 1969 and that of Fianna Fail in 1977. In its own way, each marked a particular turning point in the history of the three parties. The earliest chronologically was that of Fine Gael, known as the Just Society programme, and is seen to mark the final transformation of Fine Gael from being the traditional party of privilege and social conservatism to being a party with strong commitments to welfarism, albeit still from a largely conservative standpoint. Thus studies of Irish politics tend to speak of a pre- and a post-just society Fine Gael, the former a cadre-type

organisation which still bore the standard of the old Irish propertied classes and large farmers, the latter a more liberal, mass-oriented party with a strong commitment to the growing Irish welfare state. In fact, however, a comparison of the 1961 and 1965 programmes reveals that much of this apparent U-turn was largely rhetorical: while the long preamble devoted a lot of space to the need for social justice and an expansion of the welfare state, much of the actual policy proposals were simply reprinted from the earlier 1961 programme. Certainly Fine Gael had changed, but a careful analysis of the programmes reveals that much of the change was already apparent in 1961.

The 1969 watershed in Labour's case was not so specifically tied to the party programme of that year as to the New Republic address by Brendan Corish, the party leader, in 1967 (Corish 1968), and to the subsequent Outline Policy published in 1969. Both of these interventions marked a major attempt by the party to shift to the left of the Irish political spectrum, and both were marked by a - now evidently unjustified - optimism concerning Labour's future as a majority party of government in the 1970s. Labour's slogan then, a slogan drawn from the Corish address and the Outline Policy, and repeated in the 1969 manifesto, was "Let's Build a New Republic"; less evident, but treated with no less commitment, was the catch-phrase "The Seventies will be Socialist." The very language of Labour politics in the latter half of the 1960s, no less than the new found optimism about a future Labour Government, was a wholly new element in Irish mass politics. As two contemporary commentators noted, the change from 1965 was striking: whereas the earlier manifesto comprised 'a connection of unrelated proposals aimed not at a revolutionary reconstruction of Irish society and economy but rather at the more efficient and egalitarian working of certain aspects of the existing structure', that of 1969 'was openly based on a socialist view of the Irish economy' (Busteed and Mason 1970, p. 374). Yet again, however, as in the case of Fine Gael's just society programme, a closer

analysis reveals that much of the change was rhetorical, and that in some respects the specific proposals of Labour in 1969 were less radical than those of earlier years (see below, figure 7). But this is not to deny the very crucial impact of language and rhetoric, and the undeniable fact the Labour in 1969 was seen to be moving to the left.

The third significant manifesto in this period was that of Fianna Fail in 1977, significant less for any change in the party's ideological position (if such could be defined), but rather for the introduction of a wholly new style of Fianna Fail electoral strategy. This was, after all, the first formal manifesto which the party had issued since the war, and if nothing else was an indication that the leadership had come to believe in the presence of a sizeable floating vote which could be won over by particular policy pledges. The pledges in this case were clear-cut and simple, and indeed the manifesto was marked by a specificity and directness as well as by a level of state-sponsored generosity which left the party's opponents gasping: rates on domestic dwellings were to be abolished; road tax on cars was to be abolished, and first-time buyers of new houses were to be given a grant of £ 1,000. Against the predictions of all commentators, Fianna Fail not only won an overall majority of seats in this election, but also achieved a higher percentage of the vote than at any election since the war. According to the then party leader, Jack Lynch, the reason for the change of strategy was simple: in 'the old days one was either pro- de Valera (the founder of Fianna Fail, and its leader until 1959 when he was succeeded by Sean Lemass) or anti- de Valera, or pro-Lemass or anti-Lemass, or neither, and then one supported Labour. But these days were gone'.[3]
In other words, there now (or since the early 1970s) existed an available electorate which had to be actively wooed rather than simply taken for granted; hence the need for Fianna Fail's firt post-war manifesto.[4]

Lynch also remarked [5] that the 1977 programme was also in part a response to the perceived success of the coalition parties' 'Statement of Intent' in 1973, a document which arguably also could be included in the list of particularly important election programmes. In this case, however, the coalition's proposals were significant not for their content or even for the style with which they were presented, but rather because they marked the first time that Labour and Fine Gael had actually run on a joint programme, instead of simply hammering out a set of compromise policies in the event of their being returned with a governing majority.

4. The impact of the manifestos

The Irish case also presents immense difficulties in determining the contemporary impact of the various manifestos, in that there are so few studies of the elections prior to the 1970s, and so little survey evidence prior to 1969, that any judgements in this area must perforce be very tentative. The Just Society proposals of Fine Gael are a good case in point. Though retrospectively seen by commentators to mark a major turning point in the history of the party, the evidence for any contemporary impact is slight. Certainly Fine Gael's national vote increased, but only by slightly more than 2 per cent. Questioned afterwards about the impact of the proposals, the then chairman of the drafting committee and later party leader, Liam Cosgrave, could say only that the eventual document was 'certainly very detailed'.[6] A study written subsequent to the publication of the Just Society proposals noted that the 1965 election was called before the committee discussions could be concluded, and that the proposals as such never really came before the party and were never properly distributed.

One party worker at the time is quoted as saying that 'there was not always a clear Fine Gael position on some issues, so in writing speeches we would simply try to hammer out our own policy. When the belatedly-issued copies of the Just Society reached us, we sometimes found that statements in it were in contradiction to positions our candidate, or other party candidates, had already taken' (Kenny 1972, p. 403).

There is clearer evidence of the impact - or at least fairly widespread knowledge - of new policies in the case of Labour's 1969 programme and that of Fianna Fail in 1977. In the former case, a 1969 survey found that 20 per cent of respondents - including 19 per cent of Fine Gael supporters and 17 per cent of Fianna Fail supporters - had heard of Labour's new policies; what was less welcome news for Labour was that, of those who had heard, 42 per cent disapproved as against only 37 per cent who approved (Kenny 1972, p. 129). More detailed evidence drawn from private polls commissioned by Fine Gael concerning the impact of the programmes in 1977 shows that 76 per cent of respondents were aware of the publication of the Fianna Fail manifesto, as against 62 per cent awareness of the coalition manifesto (later in the campaign this increased to 80 per cent and 70 per cent respectively), while 27 per cent believed Fianna Fail's tantalising promises, as against 24 per cent who believed the more sombre proposals of the coalition. Respondents also tended to say that, though attractive, the Fianna Fail proposals would not be possible to implement (56 per cent), while the coalitions proposals, though less attractive, were more possible to implement (57 per cent). In general, however, voters felt that past performance (64 per cent) was more important than campaign promises (29 per cent) in ensuring a party's victory.[7]

The manifesto per se is arguably less important in terms of mass impact than are election leaflets published by the parties and which are sent to every voter on the register. These leaflets normally include an address by the party leader, a brief summary of the party's policy, and information concerning the local

candidates. The normal practice seems to be that party Headquarters prints most of the leaflet and then supplies it to the constituency organisers, who print in local details before distribution. These leaflets tend to be colourful, glossy and stylish, and the parties regularly distribute them in the one free mailing to which they - or, more properly, the candidates - are entitled by law. Again, the normal practice seems to be that the policy proposals on the leaflets are drawn from the manifesto, and it is in this sense that the manifesto can be said to have its widest, albeit quite indirect, impact. Yet even here there are often problems. The Labour party, for instance, accurately described by one commentator as 'being in the nature of a loosecoalition of like-minded but independent TDS' (Manning 1972, p. 80), suffered immense problems in 1969, when some of its rural candiates decided not to use the election leaflet which had been drawn up by party headquarters since it had been couched in much the same socialist rhetoric as the 1969 programme itself. Indeed, judging from interviews with Labour party election strategists, this is one of the party's more serious problems, in that many of the more conservative rural deputies prefer to seek re-election largely on their own terms rather than as standard- bearers of a more radical-sounding Labour party policy.

Fianna Fail also has had problems regarding the local acceptance or replication of its national policies, though in this case it may be simply a feature of the long-term lack of a formal party manifesto. One case in point was an incident which occured during the 1973 campaign, which had been opened by the coalition parties' 'Statement of Intent' which had promised, inter alia the progressive reduction of rates on property. In response to this, in the closing stages of the campaign, Jack Lynch announced that Fianna Fail would immediately abolish all rates. A couple of days later, however, an advertisement on behalf of the local Fianna Fail candidates appeared in the Limerick Leader, the main burden of which was to state that the coalition was foolish to propose the progressive reduction of rates since this would be too costly in terms of the national budget (O'Leary 1979, pp. 78-79). The advertisement had in fact been sent to the paper by the

local party organisation before Lynch's new policy was announced, yet either lack of internal party communication or simply oversight had allowed its publication to go ahead. Certainly at that time, admitted Lynch, there was very limited supervision by headquarters of what local party candidates were saying to the voters.[8]

In general, however, it is very difficult to assess the impact of programmes, whether they derive from formal manifestos, leaflets or simply new policies which emerge during the campaign. Interviews with Liam Cosgrave of Fine Gael, and Eoin Ryan, then national director of elections for Fianna Fail, tend to suggest that both parties normally favour short, snappy manifestos, since then any message can be got across more easily. According to Ryan, for instance, the 1981 Fianna Fail programme was simply 'too long', while certainly that of Fine Gael in the same election read somewhat like an university textbook in national economics.

Of all the post-war programmes, the two with possibly the greatest impact were those of Fianna Fail in 1977 - which surely must have contributed to its record post-war vote- and of the coalition parties in 1973, this latter if only because it legitimated the alliance of the two parties and thereby substantially increased the rate with which lower preference Fine Gael votes transferred to Labour, and those of Labour to Fine Gael (Cohan et al 1975).

The coalition's 1973 programme was also perhaps the most widely distributed, being reprinted in full by all three national dailies. But with this single exception, it otherwise has proved impossible to get any reliable figures on the print-runs and distribution of any of the manifestos prior to 1981. In that particular election, Fianna Fail printed 12,000 copies of its programme. These were then distributed on a geographical basis, with 200 going to each of the 41 constituencies, and the remainder going to individuals, journalists, etc. Fine Gael printed 10,000 copies of its programme, which went to party members, journalists and interest groups. The party also published 10,000 summaries of

programme, though how these were distributed is unclear. Labour printed only 1,000 copies of its 1981 manifesto, and these were distributed to the media, as well as one copy to each branch of the party, each director of elections, and each candidate. Labour also published 2,000 summaries, distributing three or four to each of its branches.

5. How the manifestos are prepared

Given the lack of available information, this section must perforce be particularly brief. As noted earlier, the lack of concern for national party policy shown by many backbench TDs effectively allows the party leadership a free hand in devising election programmes. Certainly, it is a very informal process, and none of the parties' constitutions lays down any procedures which must be followed. Fine Gael's Just Society proposals, for instance, were essentially drafted by one man, Declan Costello, a leading liberal in the party, nominal responsibility for the programme being given to a committee under the chairmanship of Liam Cosgrave, then a moderate pro-reformist and senior figure in the party, but one who was also politically acceptable to the more conservative wing of Fine Gael. Normally, Fine Gael's manifestos go before the Oireachtas (i.e. Dáil and Senate) party before publication but, as has already been noted in the case of the Just Society, even this need not be a pressing requirement. A similar situation occurred in 1981, when the parliamentary party did not see the Fine Gael manifesto, which itself was drafted by a small committee of party notables , until it was too late to make any changes.[9]

In the case of the Labour party, the Administrative Council (i.e. party executive) authorises the party leaders (Chairman, leader of the parliamentary party, secretary, etc.) to write the manifesto, and then approves it afterwards. In the case of the two coalition programmes (1973 and 1977), this party control was less evident; though all the officers of the Labour party

were involved in the discussions leading to the joint 'Statement of Intent' in 1973, the drafting was actually carried out primarily by Brendan Corish (leader) and James Tully (deputy leader) of the Labour party, and Liam Cosgrave (leader) and Tom O'Higgins (deputy leader) of Fine Gael. The coalition manifesto of 1977 was similarly drafted by representatives of both parties; in this case, however, the final approval was carried out by the Cabinet Ministers, rather than the parliamentary parties or even the party executives, with the alleged result that a number of the major 'spending' and possibly election-winning proposals were dropped at the last moment.[10] In 1981 the Labour programme was drawn up two weeks before the election by the party's campaign committee, consisting of the party leader, deputy leader, the general secretary, financial secretary, party chairman, national director of elections and the press officer.

The making of the Fianna Fail manifesto of 1977 was a much longer process. Following the party's defeat in 1973, Jack Lynch invited a number of 'experts' - including Martin O'Donoghue, then professor of economics in Trinity College, Dublin, and later a TD and Minister for Finance in the 1977 Fianna Fail government - to his home in order to establish a party 'Think-Tank'. A series of policy committees were then established, and these liaised with corresponding backbench committees in the Oireachtas; the policies which emerged from these groups than formed the basis of the manifesto. In 1981, however, the programme was devised simply by a Committee of Ministers.

In general, therefore, the procedure by which manifestos are drawn up seems to vary according to whether or not the party is in government at the time of the election. If the party is incumbent, then the tendency seems to be to rely on the cabinet members and thereby possibly to end up with a more cautious set of proposals; if it is not in government, the officers of the party, and/or the Oireachtas party tends to play a greater role. In any event, however, the procedure rarely - if ever - involves a wide range of party members. It is not a terribly open or democratic process, but then there seems very little pressure to make it so.

IV. WHAT IS SAID IN THE MANIFESTOS

1. Coding procedures

Having looked at what are generally perceived to be the main issue-dimensions in post-war Irish politics, as well as at the reliability and importance of manifestos or their surrogates as possible sources for an understanding of these issue-dimensions, it is now necessary to look at what the manifestos themselves actually say. First, however, it may be worth noting some of the details of the coding procedures involved. In accordance with the approach adopted by the ECPR research group as a whole, the manifestos were coded into the 53 specified categories (cf table 1 above), counting the quasi-sentence as the unit of analysis.[11] 'Empty' sentences, i.e. statements with no particular reference and which could not be classified into any of the coding categories, were obviously not coded, and the percentage of such sentences in the manifestos of each party for the period as a whole can be seen at the end of table 2. Separate subcategories were also initially introduced for the Irish case in the expectation that particular reference would be made to topics not included in the general coding scheme (e.g. appeals specifically directed towards small farmers, young people etc.), but in the event these proved to be unnecessary.

Also in accordance with the procedure adopted by the ECPR group as a whole, the final factor analysis normally did not include those categories which accounted for an average of less than 1 per cent in all manifestos unless these also accounted for an average of 3 per cent or more in the manifestos of any one party. In the Irish case, however, exceptions to this rule were made in the case of the categories of Nationalisation (413) and Law and Order (605). The former scored an average of only 0.7 per cent over all the manifestos, but registered an average of 2.6 per cent in the Labour manifestos, thus ranking it quite highly among the more mentioned categories in the party's programmes. Law and Order registers only 0.6

per cent over all manifestos, but scores an average of 1.5 per cent in the Fine Gael programmes, and 2.2 per cent in the pre-1965 Fine Gael programmes, and is included on the grounds that it has formed quite an important component of that party's programmes.

Finally, it should be noted that the 53 categories have been divided into seven domains, viz External Relations Freedom and Democracy, Government, Economy, Welfare, Social Fabric, and Groups.

(Figure 1 about here)

2. The domains over time

Figure 1 shows the relative weights accorded to each of the seven domains by the parties in each of the post-war elections; the relative percentage of noncoded sentences is also indicated.[12] The first feature to be noted is that Irish manifestos in general tend to be dominated by concerns in just four of the domains: Government, Economy, Welfare and Groups. External relations in particular (including references to Irish unity and Britain), but also Freedom and Democracy and Social Fabric rarely figure with any prominence. These are also some very sharp changes between elections; in 1957, for instance, the election precipitated by the resignation of the second coalition, both the Government and Social Fabric domains receive a great deal more space in the manifestos at the cost of concerns with Economy and Welfare. Government enjoys a similar surge in 1973, when the coalition strategy was revived. In this latter case, however, the change was wholly due to the relative weight of this domain in the Fianna Fail 'programme', which - as has already been noted - cannot really be treated as a proper manifesto and which has been excluded from the factor analysis presented below. It is also interesting to note the relative decline over time of the Groups domain, which received roughly equal prominence as Welfare in the



earlier post-war elections, but which then declined in relative terms before increasing again in the 1977 election.

A somewhat different picture emerges if one looks at the domain percentages over time for each party. For reasons of space, the relevant graphs are not presented here, but they do show Labour as the most consistent of the three parties in the post-war period, with programmes generally dominated by the Economy and Welfare domains, and with an increasing emphasis on Government and a decreasing emphasis on Groups during the 1960s and 1970s. Fine Gael displays a more erratic pattern: there is no mention of categories in the Welfare domain in 1948 and 1957, for instance, while the latter programme also fails to refer to Groups, and devotes over 50 per cent of its content to questions of Government. Indeed, this particular programme, which came after the party's second period as the dominant partner in a non-Fianna Fail coalition, is clearly out of step with the average profile of post-war Fine Gael manifestos, and arguably should be excluded from the factor analysis which, as will be seen below, also underlines its non-typicality.

The Fianna Fail pattern is also quite erratic, even if we exclude the 1973 programme. The Economy domain tends to dominate this party's programmes with Government also being very prominent, while the other domains are correspondingly squeezed. Welfare, for instance, received no mention in 1957, nor Social Fabric in either 1948 or 1957, nor Groups in 1961 or 1973. The omission of these latter two domains is particularly surprising since, as we shall see later, categories within them normally figure very prominently in the party's programmes. In the case of Fianna Fail, however, variations between elections are somewhat understandable given that we are often not dealing with formal, structured manifestos, but rather with speeches given by the current leader or deputy leader of the party.

One final point concerns the length of the manifestos. While inter-election comparisons are not possible in cases where no formal programme was issued, those cases which can be compared show a clearly discernible trend towards greater length. Fianna Fail's 1981 programme, for instance, contains 1,707 quasi-sentences, as against 482 in that of 1977. The four programmes published by Fine Gael (the coalition programmes are excluded) between 1961 and 1981 increase from 174 quasi-sentences to 575 in 1965, 629 in 1969 and 1,219 in 1981. Though producing a lengthier manifesto in 1951 (95 quasi-sentences) than in 1957 (72), thereafter Labour's programmes also increase in size - to 280 in 1965, 589 in 1969 and 1,037 in 1981.

3. Categories and domains, 1948-81

The relative emphasis on each of the domains as well as on the original categories can also be seen from the data in table 2, which contrasts the 1948-61 average with that of 1965-81 for each of the parties, and also shows each party's average percentage of references by category and domain for the period as a whole. The periods have been divided partly on the simple basis that each includes five elections, and partly because the 1965 publication of Fine Gael's Just Society proposals is often seen as representing a watershed in post-war Irish politics.

(Table 2 about here)

The first point to be noted about these data concerns the parties' relative emphasis on domains over the post-war period as a whole, the first significant difference in which is that between Fianna Fail and Fine Gael on the one side, and Labour on the other, in the Government domain, both of the larger parties giving slightly more than twice as much weight to this domain as does Labour. A similar large versus small party contrast is evident in the Welfare domain, where Labour averages a total

Table 2: Average Percentage of Sentences in each Category and Domain, 1948-1981: by Party

PARTY:	FIANNA FAIL			FINE GAEL			LABOUR			COALITION	ALL PARTIES
PERIOD:	1948-61	1965-81	1948-81	1948-61	1965-81	1948-81	1948-61	1965-81	1948-81	1973-1977	1948-1981
(No of Manifestoes):	(5)	(5)	(10)	(5)	(3)	(8)	(5)	(3)	(8)	(2)	(28)
CATEGORIES											
101	0	.1	.1	.2	0	.1	0	.1	0	0	.1
102	.2	3.9	2.1	3.8	1.3	2.9	.8	1.0	.9	3.2	2.0
103	0	0	0	.1	.1	.1	0	0	0	0	0
104	.2	.6	.4	0	.1	0	0	.3	.1	0	.2
105	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
106	0	.3	.1	0	.1	0	0	.5	.2	0	.1
107	0	1.1	.5	0	.5	.2	0	.7	.3	.3	.3
108	1.2	.6	.9	0	.1	0	0	.4	.1	0	.3
109	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
110	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.6	.2	0	.1
TOTAL: EXTERNAL	1.6	6.6	4.1	4.1	2.2	3.3	.8	3.6	1.8	3.5	3.1
201	2.1	2.8	2.4	2.1	1.8	2.0	.7	1.9	1.1	1.9	1.9
202	1.2	.9	1.0	3.2	2.9	3.1	1.6	4.5	2.7	2.0	2.2
203	.2	.2	.2	.5	.1	.4	0	0	0	.9	.2
204	0	.4	.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.1
TOTAL: FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY	3.5	4.3	3.8	5.8	4.8	5.5	2.3	6.4	3.8	4.8	4.4
301	.2	1.4	.8	.2	2.6	1.1	.5	2.4	1.2	1.2	1.0
302	0	0	0	0	0	0	.3	0	.2	.6	.1
303	1.1	7.6	4.3	3.6	11.4	6.5	4.6	5.9	5.1	5.6	5.3
304	1.1	0	.5	1.2	.5	1.0	0	.7	.3	0	.5
305	16.7	15.0	15.8	17.5	4.3	12.6	.6	7.7	3.3	4.6	10.5
TOTAL: GOVERNMENT	19.1	24.0	21.4	22.5	18.8	21.2	6.0	16.7	10.1	12.0	17.4

401	1.7	2.3	2.0	7.0	1.4	4.9	.8	.8	.8	1.1	2.0
402	1.4	2.5	2.0	8.3	7.3	7.9	1.9	3.7	2.6	5.5	4.1
403	.7	.4	.5	0	2.0	0.8	2.8	2.5	2.6	4.4	1.5
404	.7	1.1	.9	0	6.0	2.2	2.0	4.3	2.8	3.2	2.0
405	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
406	1.4	1.6	1.5	2.6	.9	2.0	2.5	3.4	2.9	1.6	2.0
407	.5	.2	.4	0	0	0	0	.1	.1	0	.1
408	1.0	.3	.7	1.0	.2	0.7	0	1.0	.4	1.6	.7
409	0	.1	.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
410	14.2	9.6	11.9	7.7	3.3	6.1	15.3	5.4	11.6	6.1	9.7
411	7.1	4.5	5.8	1.6	1.9	1.7	5.0	2.1	3.9	2.5	3.9
412	.8	1.0	.9	.5	4.0	1.8	5.0	7.2	5.8	3.3	2.7
413	0	.1	0	0	0	0	2.7	2.3	2.6	0	0.7
414	2.0	.4	1.3	7.8	7.4	7.7	0	1.3	.5	0.3	2.8
TOTAL: ECONOMY	31.5	24.1	28.0	36.5	34.4	35.8	38.0	34.1	36.6	29.6	32.0
501	0	.7	.3	.7	1.1	.8	0	4.6	1.7	2.3	1.0
502	1.3	1.0	1.1	.2	.8	.4	0	5.1	1.9	1.4	1.4
503	1.3	2.2	1.7	2.2	7.1	4.0	9.7	7.1	8.7	7.1	4.8
504	6.4	5.6	6.0	5.9	8.5	6.9	10.6	3.9	8.1	12.0	7.3
505	0	0	0	0	0	0	.4	0	.3	0	.1
506	3.0	4.8	3.9	1.3	2.7	1.8	2.8	2.5	2.7	3.1	3.1
507	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL: WELFARE	12.0	14.3	13.0	10.3	20.2	13.9	23.5	23.2	23.4	25.9	17.7

Table 2 continued.

601	1.0	5.9	3.4	2.3	2.9	2.5	0	1.1	.7	1.2	2.2
602	0	0	0	.9	.6	.8	0	.6	.2	0	.3
603	0	.2	.1	0	.1	0	0	.1	0	0	0
604	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
605	0	1.0	.5	2.2	.3	1.5	0	.3	.1	.3	.6
606	5.0	2.0	3.5	5.6	1.0	3.9	3.4	1.6	2.7	1.6	3.2
607	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
608	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL: SOCIAL FABRIC	6.0	9.1	7.5	11.0	4.9	8.7	3.4	3.7	3.7	3.1	6.3
701	3.5	2.0	2.7	.6	1.4	.9	8.7	1.9	6.1	0	3.0
702	10.4	6.3	8.4	5.6	4.8	5.3	11.7	4.6	9.1	5.3	7.4
703	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.1	0	0	0
704	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.1	0	0	0
705	2.9	2.2	2.5	2.4	3.6	2.8	4.0	2.9	3.6	2.7	2.9
TOTAL: GROUPS	16.8	10.5	13.6	8.6	9.8	9.0	24.4	9.6	18.8	8.0	13.3
NON CODED	9.9	7.2	8.5	1.2	5.2	2.7	1.7	2.0	1.8	8.2	4.9

of 23.4 per cent, as against 13.0 per cent and 13.9 per cent for Fianna Fail and Fine Gael respectively. Neither contrast is surprising: Fianna Fail as the only party capable of providing single-party government, and Fine Gael as the leading component of the non-Fianna Fail coalitions, have each an interest in stressing issues concerning Government as such. Labour's emphasis on welfare is also to be expected given its (admittedly very mild) socialist colouring. Other inter-party contrasts are less striking: both Fine Gael and Labour tend to place more emphasis on Economy, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael on Social Fabric, and Fianna Fail and Labour on Groups.

The inter-period contrasts are also interesting, particularly in the light of the inter-party differences noted above. Looking at the Government domain, for instance, we can see that Labour's emphasis on this area shows a marked increase in the 1965-81 period, an increase which reflects the party's late 1960s optimism about its future chances as a single-party government. Conversely, Fine Gael's emphasis on this area decreases during the later elections, to the extent that it more or less begins to reflect the Labour position more closely than that of Fianna Fail. The contrast in the Welfare domain is also striking: while both Fianna Fail and Labour maintain more or less the same degree of emphasis on Welfare, the Fine Gael figure almost doubles, going from 10.3 per cent in the early period to 20.2 per cent during the later elections. While a closer look at the figures on an election by election basis shows that this new Fine Gael emphasis on Welfare began in 1961 rather than in 1965, nevertheless the inter-period contrast shown in table 2 is very striking. It is also interesting to note that there was a corresponding decline in Fine Gael emphasis on categories in the Social Fabric domain. Inter-period contrasts are also evident in the Groups domain, with both Fianna Fail and Labour evidencing marked declines of emphasis and Fine Gael remaining more or less at the same level.

A clearer picture of these contrasts emerges if we actually look at the categories which have changed. (A more detailed assessment of the actual content of these categories will be discussed below; suffice is for now to note the actual quantitative changes.) Labour's increased emphasis on government, for instance, stems primarily from its increased emphasis on Government Authority and Effectiveness (305), which accords with the earlier remarks on the party's new optimism. At the same time, this is precisely where Fine Gael's decline in emphasis originates, as its average percentage of sentences concerning this category drops from 17.5 per cent in the first five elections to just 4.3 per cent in the second five, while there is a substantial increase in the party's emphasis on Government Efficiency (303). The Fianna Fail programmes also show an increase in the weight of Government Efficiency, and a slight decline in that of Government Authority and Effectiveness, a decline which would be even more pronounced if we exclude the abnormal score of the 1973 programme. Within the external domain, and as noted in the Introduction, Fianna Fail also registers a striking increase in the percentage of sentences in category 102, which includes pro-Irish unity statements.

There are also some striking changes in the categories within the Economy domain. The Economy category which receives most prominence in Fianna Fail's programmes, for instance, Productivity (410) declines from 14.2 per cent to 9.6 per cent, though it remains the largest single category within the domain. The Fine Gael figures show a sharp decline in Enterprise (401) and, though to a lesser extent, Productivity, while the party increases its emphasis on Controlled Economy(412). In this sense, we can already see Fine Gael moving in a somewhat leftward direction, a tendency which indeed also becomes apparent from the factor analysis below. The only significant change in Labour's programmes is in the Productivity category which, as in the case of the other two parties, registers a substantial decline.

Fianna Fail's emphases within the Welfare domain remain fairly steady. Fine Gael on the other hand registers sharp increases in its emphasis on Social Justice (503) and Social Services Expansion: Positive (504), both of which actually decline in the Labour case. However, Labour does substantially increase its emphasis on what might be seen as 'post-materialist' welfare - Environmental Protection (501) and Art, Sport, Leisure, Media (502).

All three parties evidence a declining concern for National Effort/Social Harmony (606) in the Social Fabric domain, while Fianna Fail registers an almost wholly new emphasis on Defence of National Way of Life: Positive (601). The relative emphases on the categories otherwise remain more or less steady across all three parties. Finally, we can note that much of Fianna Fail and Labour's decline in emphasis in the Groups domain occurs as a result of a weaker emphasis on appeals to Labour Groups (701) and Agriculture and Farmers (702).

(Table 3 about here)

The data in table 2 also show that quite a number of issue areas appear largely irrelevant as far as the Irish manifestos are concerned. Table 3 lists these categories, all of which have been excluded from the factor analysis below, and none of which records an average score of more than 1 per cent. Categories within all seven domains are involved, but the exclusion rules primarily effect categories in the first domain - External Relations. Given Ireland's neutrality and the low level of importance attached to the need for military defence forces, most of the exclusions in the domain are unsurprising. The one exception may be that of Europe: Positive (108), which covers pro-EC statements and references. Yet of the three parties, only Fianna Fail has devoted any real space to this category, and even in this case the degree of emphasis is relatively low. The only other category with a degree of emphasis

Table 3: EXCLUDED CATEGORIES (N=26)

Category		Average Overall Percentage
101	Relationship with Britain - Positive	.05
103	Decolonisation	.03
104	Military Positive	.18
105	Military Negative	0
106	Peace	.12
107	Internationalism Positive	.34
108	Europe Positive	.34
109	Internationalism Negative	0
110	Europe Negative	.07
203	Constitutionalism Positive	.22
204	Constitutionalism Negative	.08
302	Decentralisation Negative	.10
304	Govt. Corruption	.54
405	Corporatism	0
407	Protectionism Negative	.11
408	Economic Goals Policy non-specific	.65
409	Keynsian Demand Management	.01
505	Social Services Anti-Expansion	.08
507	Education Anti-Expansion	0
602	Defence of Irish way of Life - Negative	.29
603	Traditional Morality Positive	.04
604	Traditional Morality Negative	0
607	Communalism and Pluralism - Positive	0
608	Communalism and Pluralism - Negative	0
703	Other Economic Groups	.01
704	Underprivileged Minority Groups	.01

sufficiently low to merit comments is that of Traditional Morality: Positive (603) which accounts for an average of less than 0.1 per cent of each manifesto. As stated in table 1 above, this category covers favourable references to censorship, suppression of immorality and the maintenance and stability of the family, belief in all of which is frequently seen to characterise Irish political culture in general, and the Fianna Fail belief system in particular (e.g. Garvin 1978). The very low level of emphasis on this category may be a feature of much the same logic which can be applied to explain the absence of direct nationalist appeals (see above, pp. 10-13); in this case, however, it also may be simply that appeals on the basis of traditional morality were a feature of party programmes in the early years of the state, and that they are largely irrelevant to the concerns of post-war Irish politics.

4. What the parties emphasise

The overall picture

What the various parties don't talk about is, as we have seen, of some small interest; but it is what they actually do talk about which determines the issue-dimensions in post-war Irish politics. Table 4 shows exactly this, listing the ten most frequently mentioned categories for each party, as well as for all the parties taken together. It is from these few data that we can begin finally to define the language of party competition in post-war Ireland.

(Table 4 about here)

Let us begin with the last column on table 4, which lists the ten leading categories for all parties taken together, and which therefore shows the ten most emphasised issue areas in post-war Irish politics. Preliminary confirmation of the earlier hypothesis concerning the importance of the 'ability to govern' dimension can be seen immediately, in that Government

Table 4: LEADING CATEGORIES, 1948-1981

RANK	Party: Fianna Fail	FINE GAEL	LABOUR	Coalition (FG+Lab)	All Parties
1.	Govt. Authority and Effectiveness	Govt. Authority and Effectiveness	Productivity	Social Services-pro expansion	Govt. Authority and Effectiveness
Mean/SD	15.8/17.9	12.6/15.4	11.6/8.9	12.0/4.3	10.5/14.2
2.	Productivity	Incentives	Agriculture/ Farmers	Social Justice	Productivity
Mean/SD	11.9/9.3	7.9/8.0	9.1 /5.6	7.1/9.1	9.7/8.3
3.	Agriculture/ Farmers	Economic Orthodoxy	Social Justice	Democracy	Agriculture/ Farmers
Mean/SD	8.4 /6.1	7.7 /4.8	8.7/7.6	7.1/6.0	7.4/5.2
4.	Social Services-pro expansion	Social Services-pro expansion	Social Services pro-expansion	Productivity	Social Services-pro expansion
Mean/SD	6.0/4.7	6.9/6.9	8.1/5.9	6.1/7.0	7.3/5.6
5.	Technology/Infrastructure	Govt. Efficiency	Labour Groups	Govt. Efficiency	Govt. Efficiency
Mean/SD	5.8/5.2	6.5/6.4	6.1/5.5	5.6/1.6	5.3/5.6
6.	Govt. Efficiency	Productivity	Controlled Economy	Incentives	Social Justice
Mean/SD	4.3/6.9	6.1/5.9	5.8/5.7	5.5/3.1	4.8/5.5
7.	Education: Pro-expansion	Agriculture/ Farmers	Govt. Efficiency	Agriculture/ Farmers	Incentives
Mean/SD	3.9/3.9	5.3/4.0	5.1/3.6	5.3/0.5	4.1/5.2
8.	National effort and social harmony	Enterprise	Technology/ Infrastructure	Govt. Authority and Effectiveness	Technology/Infrastructure
Mean/SD	3.5/4.6	4.9/5.7	3.9/3.4	4.6/3.0	3.9/4.0
9.	Defence of Irish way of life - positive	Social Justice	Non-Economic Demographic Groups	Regulation of Capitalism	National Effort and Social harmony
Mean/SD	3.4/6.3	4.0/3.3	3.6/2.8	4.4/4.9	3.2/3.4
10.	Labour groups	National Effort and social harmony	Govt. Authority and Effectiveness	Controlled Economy	Labour Groups
Mean/SD	2.7/2.7	3.9/3.5	3.3/3.9	3.3/1.7	3.0/3.9
N of Manifestos	10	8	8	2	28
N of quasi-sentences	1482	1752	1382	414	5030
Percentage of uncoded sentences					
Mean/SD	8.5/8.6	2.7/3.2	1.8/1.7	8.2/1.1	4.9/6.2

Authority and Effectiveness (305) ranks first of the ten leading categories. But exactly what sort of appeals does this important category include? In the Fianna Fail case the relevant statements run from:

> 'All our cards are on the table, face upwards. If Fianna Fail gets a majority in the new Dail, the Government will consist of members of our party chosen, by the Taoiseach, for their personal suitability for the Departments to which they are appointed and for their capacity to work together as a team. In all democracies, in normal times, that is how effective governments are formed ..... As an alternative you are offered some kind of coalition. Nobody really wants government by a coalition. Every coalition Government - irrespective of the quality of its members - is a bad government' (FF54)

to: 'Fianna Fail - recognising the needs of the future, will ensure that the leadership, knowledge and determination to achieve the necessary changes in structure ..... (etc)' (FF77)

In the case of Fine Gael, from:

> '(it is) desirable to weaken that party which stood alone demanding an overall majority for itself, and so, through seeking what it was impossible to obtain, confused public life and made only for instability of government' (FG57)

to: 'What the country needs now (and has not been getting) is a government which will be prepared to govern. Fine Gael will give Ireland such a government' (FG81)

And with Labour (just one example will suffice):

> 'There is only one way forward - with Labour. But there are many ways backwards. Labour will not retard the growth of the new politics by cynically abandoning its deals for short term party advantage. The hopes of the future will not be betrayed.' (L69)

Closely following Government Authority and Effectiveness as the second leading issue in Irish politics is Productivity (410), a very clearcut and time-honoured theme in Irish politics, emphasising as it does the need for economic growth and expansion as well as the need for greater levels of employment and job opportunities for younger people and would-be emigrants. References to Agriculture and Farmers (702) come third in the list of leading categories, with Social Services: Pro-Expansion (504) fourth; these high rankings are not surprising - the one a natural response to the electoral importance of a substantial sector of Irish society, and the other a feature of the very extensive attempts to build up the Irish welfare state from the early 1960s onwards (Maguire 1983). The relative importance of Government Efficiency (303), in fifth place, again is unsurprising given its substantive association with the leading category, Government Authority, and given the initial expectation that 'governing'-related issues would figure prominently in Irish party programmes. Where the issue differs from that of Government Authority is that it encompasses the politics of administrative efficiency which, particularly in the Fine Gael case, involves frequent commitments to the establishment of new government agencies to solve specific problems. The remaining five issues are, in order of importance, Social Justice (503), Incentives (402), Technology/Infrastructure (411), National Effort and Social Harmony (606) and Labour Groups (701), and these will be treated in the context of the following discussion of the individual parties (since there were only two coalition manifestos, these will not be discussed separately).

Fianna Fail

The ten leading categories in the case of Fianna Fail reflect very closely those of all the parties rather together. As might be expected, Government Authority is far and away the most highly emphasised Fianna Fail category, with Productivity second, Agriculture/Farmers third, and Social Services: Pro-Expansion fourth. All four suggest a very ready and appropriate image of Fianna Fail in the post-war years as the dominant Irish political party, intent on maintaining its original rural base and, at the same time, setting out to modernise and expand the economy as well as to develop a welfare state which would be sufficiently strong to sustain the needs of the other major segment of its electorate, the urban working class. The high ranking of Technology/Infrastructure is perhaps more surprising, but in fact the category also easily fits into this image of a modernising party, ranging from promises to develop 'rural electrification, arterial drainage, (and) Power Station construction' (FF48) to commitments that, in order 'to have a competitive advantage over foreigners, industry will be induced to have a structure which will more readily assimilate science and technology' (FF77). The relatively high ranking of National Effort and Social Harmony in Fianna Fail manifestos further emphasises the particularities of the party's appeal. For instance, having outlined the possible future difficulties which might be faced as a result of a slow-down in emigration and Ireland's entry into the European Community, the then Fianna Fail Taoiseach emphasised that 'the national effort, considerable though it has been, needs to be developed again ... future prosperity (will be ensured) only by a great, persistent and intelligent effort, in which all the people participate' (FF61). This is the essence of Fianna Fail's 'other' nationalism - an appeal to national unity which is expressed in social rather than territorial terms, and which stems from the party's self-image as the builder of a modern Ireland which can stand securely in the face of a hostile international environment. Yet the modern Ireland which the party wished to build was not to be one in which old traditions would be destroyed. Hence the importance of the category Defence of Irish Way of Life: Positive

(601), a topic which received particular emphasis in 1969, when the party stressed the importance of strong rural communities and the importance in these of the 'small family farm', and further added that 'the preservation of the (Irish) language is inextricably bound up with and is our most distinctive badge of our own separate nationhood. No nation has ever voluntary abandoned its own language, and we have no intention of abandoning ours' (FF69). Fianna Fail's stress on 'defence of the Irish way' was partly a reaction to the threatened rise of the more socialist-sounding Labour party, and partly in response to the Fine Gael voices which spoke of ending the compulsory teaching of Irish in schools. But even apart from the specific circumstances of 1969, the thread of an appeal to traditional Ireland has always run through Fianna Fail rhetoric, though at times it has sat uneasily with the party's commitment to social and economic development. Here too, perhaps, we are tapping into a variant of a commitment to traditional morality, the specific category (603) which, it will be recalled, received a surprisingly low emphasis in the party's programmes.

Fine Gael

Though Fine Gael shows many leading categories in common with Fianna Fail - we may note in particular the emphasis on Government Authority - the few differences which do exist are very striking. The second ranking Fine Gael category, for instance, is Incentives, which does not figure at all in the ten leading Fianna Fail categories, while the third category, Economic Orthodoxy (414) is also absent from the Fianna Fail list. As was stated in table 1, Incentives is the category covering references to wage and tax policies which are designed to encourage enterprise, references to which abound in almost all Fine Gael's programmes. In the Just Society document, for instance, the party pledged itself to 'encourage the return from abroad of Irish nationals with managerial experience

by moderating the incidence of taxation on earned incomes at certain levels' and to 'alter the present system of charging depreciation for tax purposes, so that adequate provision can be made for the replacement of fixed assets and thereby assist increased production' (FG65). This particular programme also specifies at great length 'the need for a rational determination of credit policy' and the need to strengthen the powers of the Central Bank, themes similar to those which again echo in other programmes of the party, and which contribute to the high ranking of the Economic Orthodoxy (414) category. The party's emphasis on Enterprise (401) is yet another example of this time of thinking and, indeed, ranks above Social Justice in the party's leading categories. In terms of the later programmes, however, Social Justice receives a much greater emphasis by Fine Gael than does Enterprise (cf table 2 above). Though this new stress is already evident in 1961, it is again in the 1965 programme that the party's new appeal is most clearly formulated, as, for instance, can be noted in the Introduction to the Just Society document which states that 'equality of opportunity is, in contemporary Ireland, non-existent. We seek office to work towards a society in which freedom and equality are not concepts from an academic textbook but are expressed in real and tangible conditions which all our people can enjoy'(FG65).

Labour

Labour, the smallest of the three parties, is perhaps most striking for the relatively low emphasis which it places on Government Authority, which ranks tenth in the party's list of leading categories as against first in the leading categories of both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael. The first ranking category for Labour is Productivity, a reflection of the party's persistent concern with the need to tackle unemployment and emigration. What is perhaps surprising to those not familiar with Labour's history is that Agriculture/Farmers ranks significantly higher than Labour Groups. Although orienting itself increasingly towards

an urban electorate in the late 1960s, however, Labour has traditionally been a party of the rural and small town proletariat as well as, to an extent, a party which wins certain support from small farmers. Indeed, in many cases one gets the impression that Labour's emphasis on agriculture stems not so much from a desire to expand its rural base, but rather from the need to avoid alienating its traditional support. Moreover, while the emphasis on agriculture has declined over time (cf table 2), it remains relatively pronounced vis a vis the party's emphasis on Labour groups. Indeed, both categories evidence a decline over time, as does Labour emphasis on the other 'Groups' category in its leading ten issues, Non-Economic Demographic Groups (705). The decline in all three suggests that rather than attempting to change its base from one sector of the population to another, Labour instead has been seeking to generalise its appeal in a fashion similar to that of its larger opponents, but using a more socialist rhetoric to do so. One possible symptom of this is the relative growth in emphasis on the category Controlled Economy (412) which ranks sixth in the leading categories for the post-war period as a whole, and which receives relatively greater emphasis in the manifestos published from 1965 onwards (cf table 2 above).

Party specific categories and valence issues

A recent analysis of British and American party programmes by Budge and Farlie (1983) suggests that parties do not so much compete on the same issues but rather 'own' particular issues which they then stress at election time. In other words, parties talk past one another rather than engaging in direct confrontation, and individual parties succed or fail according to the salience of, or electoral concern for their issues rather than those of their opponents. To the extent that this is true, then in Ireland as elsewhere we should find evidence of such 'selective emphases' in the lists of the leading categories of the parties;

that is, we could expect to find categories within one party's list which are not present in the other parties' lists, and each party could be expected to have its own set of exclusive issues. Conversely, to the extent that we find similarities across all the different lists of leading categories, these common categories could be seen to represent 'consensual' issues which all three parties find it necessary to emphaise.

Assessing the data in table 4 in these terms suggests a rather intriquing picture whereby much of that Fianna Fail emphasises is not specific to it as a party, while much of what Fine Gael emphasises is party-specific. Taking the Fianna Fail case first, we see that its first four leading categories are shared by both Fine Gael and Labour (though the rankings differ), as is its sixth leading category. Of the remaining five categories, two (Technology/Infrastructure and Labour Groups)are shared by Labour, and one (National Effort/Social Harmony) by Fine Gael. Two categories alone are exclusive to Fianna Fail - Education: Pro-Expansion, which is not of itself a very significant issue in Irish politics, and Defence of Irish Way of Life: Positive, which is rather appropriate in the case of a party which traditionally has seen itself as the repository of the national conscience. Neither category ranks particularly high in the Fianna Fail list, however, the one being in seventh and the other in ninth position.

Fine Gael presents quite a different and in many senses more revealing picture. Though five of its leading categories are shared by both Fianna Fail and Labour, a sixth (Social Justice) by Labour alone, and a seventh (National Effort) by Fianna Fail alone, its three remaining exclusive categories both rank relatively highly (second, third and eighth positions) and fit together in a wider, substantive sense. These categories are Incentives, Economic Orthodoxy and Enterprise, all three of which can be seen to represent a classic economic conservatism, and all three of which in this sense help to create the most clearly definable profile of any of the three Irish parties. Fine Gael

was traditionally the party of the Irish propertied class, representing the large farming and commercial interests which feared the rise of Fianna Fail in the late 1920s and early 1930s. And while Fianna Fail has since become the party of Government in Ireland, Fine Gael has nevertheless remained in many senses the party of the social and economic establishment (Mair 1983); notwithstanding its relatively recent conversion to social justice, and notwithstanding its even more recent attempts to win the support of a broader and more socially heterogeneous section of the Irish electorate, the evidence of its programmes suggests the maintenance of a classic conservative appeal.

The profile presented by Labour is much less distinctive. Five of its leading categories (including the first, second and fourth) are shared by both its opponents, one other by Fine Gael alone (Social Justice), and two by Fianna Fail alone (Labour Groups and Technology/Infrastructure). There remain two exclusive issues, Controlled Economy and Non-Economic Demographic Groups, the first of which has already been briefly discussed above, and neither of which rank in the top five leading issues of the party.

The data in table 4 further suggest the existence of five 'consensual' issues (as defined above to mean those categories included in the leading categories of all three parties and, in this case, in those of the two coalition manifestos); Government Authority, Productivity, Agriculture/Farmers, Social Services: Pro-Expansion, and Government Efficiency. Two of these five come from the Government domain, and one each from the Economy, Groups and Welfare domains. That these are consensual issues is not in itself surprising; what is significant, however, is their relative rankings in the parties' lists. The five rank in the first four and sixth positions in the Fianna Fail programmes, in the first, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh positions in the Fine Gael manifestos, and in the first, second, fourth, seventh and tenth positions in the Labour manifestos.

If we score these rankings, giving a score of 10 to the first position, 9 to the second position, and so on, then a maximum emphasis on the five consensual issues would be indicated by a score of 40 (10+9+8+7+6) and a minimum emphasis by a score of 15 (5+4+3+2+1). The closer a party's score on these categories approaches to 40,then the closer that party comes to placing a maximum emphasis on consensual issues. The actual scores are revealing, with Fianna Fail at 39, Fine Gael at 32, Labour at 31 and the coalition at 30.

Scoring exclusive issues, on the other hand (i.e. those categories which appear only in the list of one party - the coalition is excluded here), we find that Fianna Fail scores 6 out of a possible maximum of 19, Fine Gael scores 20 out of a possible maximum of 27, and Labour scores 6 out of a possible maximum of 19. In other words, Fianna Fail places the greatest emphasis on consensual issues, while Fine Gael places the greatest emphasis on party-specific issues. Here perhaps more than anywhere else we see the most concrete evidence to bolster Fianna Fail's traditional claim to be the only 'national' party, as against the more 'sectional' appeal of its major opponent.

V. THE FIRST-STAGE FACTOR ANALYSIS

(Note: pressures of time prevent a full assessment of the results of the factor analysis. This and the following section of the paper will therefore be presented in abbreviated form.)

In common with the procedures adopted by the ECPR research group, the factor analysis was conducted in two stages. The first stage involves factor analysing the data within each domain, and the second stage involves analysing the factor scores which result from the first stage. Two points are worth noting here: first, the first-stage analysis normally includes only categories which record at least 1 per cent of all manifestos or at least 3 per cent of the manifestos of a particular party. Though there are two exceptions to this rule in the Irish case (see above, pp. 36-37), this means that all the categories listed in table 3 above are excluded from the factor analysis. Since this also means that only one category remains in the External domain and two in the Freedom and Democracy domain, these original categories are used directly in lieu of factor scores as inputs into the second stage. The second point to note is that the unusual character of the Fianna Fail 'manifesto' of 1973 means that is also excluded from the factor analysis.

(Tables 5-9 about here)

Table 5 reports the results of the factor analysis in the Government domain, the first to be treated in this way. The loadings are quite straightforward and interpretable: factor 3:1, which we call Government Efficiency, loads very heavily onto Decentralisation: Positive and slightly less heavily onto Government Efficiency itself. Factor 3:2, loads very heavily onto Government Authority and Effectiveness, and is called simply Government Authority.

Table 5: First-Stage Factor Analysis - Government.

GOVERNMENT

Varimax rotated factor matrix

Categories	Factor 3.1 Government Efficiency	Factor 3.2 Government Authority
301 Decentralisation Positive	.922	-.017
303 Government Efficiency	.778	-.388
305 Government Authority and Effectiveness	-.143	.971
Eigenvalue	1.47	1.09
Percent of variance	49	36

Categories excluded due to very low use:

302 Decentralisation, negative
304 Government corruption

Table 6: First-Stage Factor Analysis - Economy

ECONOMY

Varimax rotated factor matrix

Categories	Factor 4.1 Capitalist Economy	Factor 4.2 Socialist Economy	Factor 4.3 Incentives vs. Productivity
401 Enterprise	.711	-.367	.160
402 Incentives	.488	.057	.600
403 Regulation of capitalism	-.355	.423	.375
404 Economic planning	.111	.805	.123
406 Protectionism positive	-.155	-.011	.391
410 Productivity	-.123	.077	-.867
411 Technology and Infrastructure	-.617	-.489	.308
412 Controlled economy	-.058	.640	-.248
413 Nationalisation	-.216	.564	.043
414 Economic orthodoxy	.781	-.071	-.033
Eigenvalue	1.96	1.94	1.61
Percent of variance	20	19	16

Categories excluded due to low use:

405 Corporatism
407 Protectionism negative
408 Non-specific economic goals
409 Keynsian demand management

Table 7: First-Stage Factor Analysis - Welfare

WELFARE

Varimax rotated factor matrix

Categories	Factor 5.1 Quality of Life	Factor 5.2 Social Services vs. Social Justice
501 Environmental protection	.936	-.018
502 Art, sport, leisure, media	.923	.269
503 Social Justice	-.129	-.675
504 Social services, pro-expansion	-.441	.605
506 Education, pro-expansion	.188	.846
Eigenvalue	1.97	1.61
Percent of variance	39	32

Categories excluded due to low use :

505 Social services, anti-expansion
507 Education, anti-expansion

Table 8: First-Stage Factor Analysis - Fabric of Society

FABRIC OF SOCIETY

Varimax rotated factor matrix

Categories	Factor 6.1 Social Discipline	Factor 6.2 Defence of Irish way of Life
601 Defence of Irish way of life, positive	.005	.964
605 Law and Order	.820	-.229
606 National effort and social harmony	.807	.251
Eigenvalue	1.32	1.04
Percent of variance	44	35

Categories excluded due to low use:

602 Defence of Irish way of life, negative
603 Traditional morality, positive
604 Traditional morality, negative
607 Communalism and pluralism, positive
608 Communalism and pluralism, negative

Table 9: First-Stage Factor Analysis - Groups.

GROUPS

Varimax rotated factor matrix

Categories	Factor 7.1 Non-economic Groups and Labour	Factor 7.2 Economic Groups
701 Labour groups	.653	.628
702 Agriculture and farmers	-.061	.951
705 Non-economic demographic groups	.947	-.076
Eigenvalue	1.33	1.30
Percent of variance	44	43

Categories excluded due to low use:

703 Other economic groups
704 Underprivileged minority groups

Table 6 reports the results of the analysis in the Economy domain. Here three factors were extracted: factor 4:1, positively loading on Enterprise, Incentives and Economic Orthodoxy, and negatively on Technology/Infrastructure, has been labelled Capitalist Economy. Factor 4:2 loads positively on Economic Planning, Controlled Economy and Nationalisation, and this has been labelled Socialist Economy. Factor 4:3 is less readily interpreted, loading positively on Incentives and negatively on Productivity. Since only the first two factors are used as inputs into the second-stage analysis, this third factor, labelled simply Incentives vs. Productivity, is less relevant to our concerns here.

Table 7 reports the analysis of the Welfare domain. The first factor here, factor 5:1, loads very heavily onto Environmental Protection and Art, Sport, Leisure, Media, and has been called simply Quality of Life. Factor 5:2 loads positively on Social Services: Pro-Expansion and Education: Pro-Expansion and negatively on Social Justice. Perhaps this factor represents a tendency to make specific commitments to expand the welfare state as against a tendency to make simply rhetorical commitments to the general idea of social justice; in any case, it has been labelled Social Services vs. Social Justice.

Table 8 reports the analysis in the Social Fabric domain. Factor 6:1 loads on Law and Order and National Effort and Social Harmony. In one sense this represents the view that all should work together in the national interest, and, if there is unwillingness to do so, then the forces of the state will be used to control any signs of dissidence. In any case, both categories sit well together - the one representing the force of law, the other the force of persuasion - and the factor has been labelled Social Discipline. Factor 6:2 loads heavily onto only Defence of the Irish Way of Life: Positive, and has been labelled accordingly.

Table 9 reports the analysis in the Groups domain, the last to be considered here. Factor 7:1 loads onto Labour Groups and Non-Economic Demographic Groups (mainly involving women and young people), and suggests a concern for sections of the population which may be seen in some way to have little influence or to be discriminated against. It is labelled simply Non-Economic Groups and Labour. Factor 7:2 loads very heavily onto Agriculture/Farmers and slightly less heavily onto Labour Groups, both of which represent significant economic sectoral interests. The factor is therefore called Economic Groups.

(Table 10 about here)

Finally, table 10 reports the means and standard deviations, by party, of the factor scores derived from the first-stage analysis. These factor scores, plus the remaining original categories in the External and Freedom and Democracy domains have been used as the input data for the second-stage factor analysis. The table itself needs little comment. The Government Efficiency factor tends to divide Fianna Fail and Labour from Fine Gael, while Government Authority tends to divide the larger parties from Labour. Within the Economy domain, Labour scores positively on Socialist Economics and negatively on Capitalist Economics, with Fine Gael showing the completely reverse pattern, and Fianna Fail scoring negatively on both. Fine Gael, in turn, scores negatively on both welfare factors, with Fianna Fail scoring positively on Social Services vs. Social Justice and negatively on Quality of Life, while Labour shows the opposite pattern. Within the Social Fabric domain, Fianna Fail is the only party with a positive score on Defence of Irish Way of Life; Fine Gael scores quite highly on Social Discipline, while Labour records negative scores on both factors. Finally, in the Groups domain, Labour socres positively and Fine Gael negatively on both factors, with Fianna Fail recording a positive score on Economic Groups and a negative score on Non-Economic Groups and Labour. If any pattern is evident at his early stage, then it is one which suggests a division

Table 10: Means and Standard Deviations of Factor Scores by Parties and Domains

Parties (N)	Fianna Fail (9)		Fine Gael (8)		Labour (8)		Coalition (FG+Lab) (2)	
	$\bar{X}$	SD	$\bar{X}$	SD	$\bar{X}$	SD	$\bar{X}$	SD
Domains and Factors								
GOVERNMENT								
FI Govt. Efficiency	-0.109	1.053	0.191	1.068	-0.059	1.115	-0.034	0.120
FII Govt. Authority	0.196	0.987	0.312	1.320	-0.443	0.652	-0.359	0.295
ECONOMY								
FI Capitalist Economy	-0.385	0.589	1.116	0.984	-0.608	0.473	-0.300	0.663
FII Socialist Economy	-0.664	0.560	-0.123	1.004	0.744	1.027	0.508	0.164
WELFARE								
FI Quality of Life	-0.056	0.396	-0.146	0.495	0.197	1.793	0.047	0.078
FII Social Services vs. Social Justice	0.409	1.014	-0.224	0.565	-0.275	1.170	0.150	1.849
SOCIAL FABRIC								
FI Social Discipline	0.057	0.758	0.320	1.638	-0.282	0.324	-0.409	0.256
FII Defence of Irish Way of Life	0.360	1.501	-0.009	0.893	-0.315	0.177	-0.319	0.018
GROUPS								
FI Non-Economic Groups + Labour	-0.137	0.696	-0.169	1.037	0.398	1.327	-0.301	0.659
FII Economic Groups	0.243	1.019	-0.568	0.748	0.458	1.074	-0.653	0.261

between Fine Gael and Labour, with Fianna Fail somewhere in between: the two former parties show quite opposing scores in the Government, Economy, Social Fabric and Groups domains. Only in the second welfare factor do their mean scores look the same vis a vis a quite different Fianna Fail mean score, though it is also interesting to note the second factor in the Social Fabric domain, where Fine Gael's slightly negative mean score tends to place it on the same side of the divide as Labour. However, it should also be noted that the high standard deviations suggest that these particular data should be threated with caution.

VI. THE SECOND-STAGE FACTOR ANALYSIS

The second and final stage of the factor analysis reveals five second-order factors which represent the five principal issue dimensions in post-war Irish politics. Table 11 reports the loadings of these five dimensions on the factors derived from the first-stage analysis and on the three original categories (102,201 and 202) used as input in the External and Freedom and Democracy domains. Table 11 also shows the correlation coefficients between Dimensions I to V with the original categories used in the first-stage domain analysis. These coefficients are shown in order to get a clearer picture of the actual substance of the five dimensions.

(Table 11 about here)

The first dimension (i.e. the first second-stage factor) has been defined as Principles Governing the Organisation of Society, a bipolar factor with positive loadings indicating a conservative emphasis and negative loadings indicating a liberal emphasis. The positive loadings are on (first-stage) factors 3:1, Government Authority, and 6:1, Social Discipline. In terms of the original categories included in the first-stage analysis, Dimension I correlates positively ($r \geqslant .5$) with categories 305,605 and 606. Dimension I also loads negatively on factor 7:1, Non-Economic Groups and Labour, and correlates negatively with categories 504 and 705. Perhaps the closest approximation to this dimension in terms of what has been identified as one of the major components in Irish political culture, is authoritarianism (e.g. Schmitt 1973, pp 43-54). But since the dimension relates so specifically to the original category and first-stage factor Government Authority, then

SECOND ORDER FACTORS

Table 11: Second-Stage Factor Analysis

Rotated solution	I Principles governing the organisation of society: Conservative(+) vs. Liberal (-)	II Emphasis on Capitalist Economy and Irish Unity	III Emphasis on Rights of the Individual	IV Emphasis on Education and Irish Culture	V Emphasis on Socialist Economy
DOMAIN : EXTERNAL					
1st stage Factor 1:1 Relationship with Britain negative: pro-Irish unity (= original category 102)	-.276	.672	.031	.319	-.298
DOMAIN : FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY					
1st stage Factor 2:1 Freedom and Domestic Human Rights (= original category 201)	-.148	.003	.643	.241	-.085
1st stage Factor 2:2 Democracy (= original category 202)	-.138	.168	.670	-.272	.119
DOMAIN : GOVERNMENT					
1st stage Factor 3:1 Government Efficiency	-.082	.017	.135	-.143	.269
1st stage Factor 3:2 Government Authority	.812	.091	-.032	-.198	-.108
ORIGINAL CATEGORIES (r)					
301 Decentralisation, positive	-.201	.059	.196	-.226	.300
303 Government efficiency	-.256	-.081	.045	.058	.280
305 Government authority and effectiveness	.886	.074	-.085	-.161	-.171

Continued...

Table 11continued

	I	II	III	IV	V
DOMAIN : ECONOMY					
1st stage Factor 4:1 Capitalist economy	.103	.682	.134	.128	-.025
1st stage Factor 4:2 Socialist economy	-.155	.047	-.028	-.295	.710
ORIGINAL CATEGORIES (r)					
401 Enterprise	-.126	.517	.280	.421	-.386
402 Incentives	-.348	.585	-.105	-.031	-.076
403 Regulation of capitalism	-.201	-.169	.168	-.292	.290
404 Economic planning	-.144	.072	.067	-.165	.743
406 Protectionism, positive	-.151	-.196	.356	-.104	-.051
410 Productivity	.386	-.351	-.108	-.083	.100
411 Technology and Infrastructure	-.248	-.504	-.140	.005	-.381
412 Controlled economy	-.277	.037	-.278	-.431	.433
413 Nationalisation	-.104	-.228	.015	-.009	.511
414 Economic Orthodoxy	.286	.456	.201	-.070	-.007
DOMAIN : WELFARE					
1st stage Factor 5:1 Quality of life	.062	-.024	-.004	.069	.422
1st stage Factoe 5:2 Social services vs. Social Justice	-.208	-.018	-.074	.647	-.165
ORIGINAL CATEGORIES (r)					
501 Environmental protection	-.098	.081	-.034	-.008	.520
502 Art, sport, leisure, media	-.111	-.060	-.113	.208	.384
503 Social justice	-.346	-.011	-.056	-.502	.203
504 Social services, pro-expansion	-.611	.128	-.230	.202	-.261
506 Education, pro-expansion	-.201	-.124	.003	.831	-.006

Table 11 continued

	I	II	III	IV	V
DOMAIN : FABRIC OF SOCIETY					
1st stage Factor 6:1 Social Discipline	.844	.119	-.302	-.002	-.070
1st stage Factor 6:2 Defence of Irish way of life	.028	.192	.131	.691	-.021
ORIGINAL CATEGORIES (r)					
601 Defence of Irish way of life, positive	-.011	.231	.114	.764	-.067
605 Law and order	.669	.107	-.336	-.198	-.147
606 National effort and social harmony	.761	.114	-.186	.211	.016
DOMAIN : GROUPS					
1st stage Factor 7:1 Non-economic groups and Labour	-.622	.125	-.647	-.177	-.378
1st stage Factor 7:2 Economic groups	-.193	-.698	.066	.131	-.199
ORIGINAL CATEGORIES (r)					
701 Labour groups	-.443	-.400	-.504	-.136	-.421
702 Agriculture and farmers	-.227	-.749	.179	.226	-.201
705 Non-economic demographic groups	-.675	.192	-.590	-.133	-.406
Eigenvalue	2.00	1.51	1.44	1.35	1.09
Percent of Var.	15	12	11	10	8

N of cases : 27
N of original categories : 27
Note: values ≥.5 are underlined.

it can also be seen to reflect a variant of the hypothesised 'ability to govern' issue. Indeed, Dimension I seems to span both Government Authority and - for want of a better term - Social Authority in a fashion which suggests a heavy emphasis on a sort of Irish dirigisme. Certainly, Dimension I bears no relation to what has normally been considered to be the main motive force of Irish political alignments, i.e. the issue of territorial nationalism.

The second principal dimension in Table 11 has been identified as Emphasis on Capitalist Economics and Irish Unity. This dimension loads positively on category 102 and factor 4:1, Capitalist Economy, and correlates positively with categories 401 and 402. Though less than 0.5, the relatively strong correlation with category 414 is also noteworthy. The negative loading of Dimension II is simply on factor 7:2, Economic Groups, correlating negatively with categories 411 and 702. The association in Dimension II of an otherwise straight 'capitalist economics' loading with Irish unity is, I believe, largely fortuitous. As has already been noted, the Economy categories involved here are primarily the 'exclusive' issues of Fine Gael, while Fine Gael is also the party which has tended to place greater and more consistent emphasis on pro-Irish unity statements. In this sense, Dimension II is tapping the particular emphases of Fine Gael.

Dimension III is of less substantive importance. Identified here as Emphasis on Rights of the Individual, the only loadings of significance are on categories 201 and 202, and factor 7:1, non-Economic Groups and Labour, on which it loads negatively. Dimension III also correlates negatively with two of the original Groups categories, 701 and 705. What this dimension seems to tap therefore is a belief in the rights of the individual as against the representation of sectional or group interests.

Dimension IV is perhaps the closest to a purely 'Fianna Fail dimension', correlating positively with categories 506 and 601, both of which have been identified as the only 'exclusive' Fianna Fail categories. Defined here as Emphasis on Education and Irish Culture, Dimension IV loads positively onto factors 5:2, Social Services vs Social Justice, and 6:2, Defence of Irish Way of Life. It also shows a negative, but not very strong correlation with the original category 503.

Dimension V has been defined here as Emphasis on Socialist Economy, and in some sense may be considered the obverse of Dimension II. It loads positively onto factor 4:2, Socialist Economy, and correlates positively with categories 404,413 and 501. Dimension V has no significant negative loadings, nor does it show any significant negative correlations with any of the original categories. In this sense it is a very unipolar dimension, appearing to tap specifically Labour emphases in the manifestos.

Plotting the Parties

The definition of Dimensions I to V clearly represents one of the more important findings of this study, but unfortunately pressures of time prevent their fuller elaboration and discussion. The remaining part of this section will therefore be devoted to commenting briefly on a plotting of the various parties' positions along combinations of these five dimensions, a more complete analysis of which will have to wait for a later draft. Figures 2 to 5 and 2A to 5A show these party positions. Each of the main figures (2 to 5) is accompanied by a summary figure (2A to 5A), while some of the latter also employ a crude periodisation to show the parties' movements through time.

(Figures 2 and 2A about here)

Figure 2: Plot of parties on Dimensions I and II



Figure 2A: Summary of parties' positions on Dimensions I and II.



Notes: [1] Excludes 1951 & 1957
[2] Excludes 1969

Figure 2 maps the parties' positions in the space created by Dimensions I and II. The first point to note here is the relatively consistent positioning of the two larger parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael. If we ignore for a moment the clearly outlying positions of FG51 and FG57, as well as that of FF69, we find that Fine Gael tends to lie in a relatively small area on the positive side of Dimension II, while Fianna Fail occupies a slighlt larger area on the negative side of this dimension. Both parties straddle Dimension I, Principles Governing the Organisation of Society, while it is precisely this dimension (tapping a small vs large party conflict?) which separates Labour from its two opponents. It is also interesting to note the marked conservative trend in Fianna Fail programmes between 1948 and 1961 as shown by their increasing shift to the right along Dimension I. Labour straddles the Capitalist Economy and Irish Unity dimension and, surprisingly, we can see that, with the exception of L51, all of the party's pre-1969 programmes fall on the 'low' emphasis side of this dimension. Moreover, neither the positions shown in Figure 2, nor those summarised in Figure 2A, really suggest much of an issue-basis for the Fine Gael-Labour coalitions. As can be seen from Figure 2A, the coalition programmes of 1973 and 1977 occupy a position very close to that of Fine Gael (ignoring FG51 and FG57), while the average Labour location is quite distant. The only possible justification for coalition evident from these Figures is if the coalition were to be based on alignments along Dimension I. Yet though the average position of Labour and that of Fine Gael are on the 'liberal' side of this Dimension, nevertheless even here Fine Gael is closer to Fianna Fail than it is to Labour.

(Figures 3 and 3A about here)

Figure 3: Plot of Parties on Dimensions I and IV.



Figure 3A: Summary of parties' positions on Dimensions I and IV.



Notes: [1] Excludes 1969
[2] Excludes 1948 & 1957
[3] Excludes 1951

The relative positions of the parties are much less distinct in Figure 3, which represents the space created by Dimensions I and IV, the latter being that identified as the closest approximation to a purely Fianna Fail dimension. In this case, both of the larger parties tend to straddle both dimensions, but there is also a slight tendency towards a separation of Fine Gael and Labour with Fianna Fail orienting towards the centre position vis a vis the other parties. Yet if we look at the summary of these positions in Figure 3A the picture is quite different and, moreover, suggests an issue-basis for the Fine Gael-Labour coalition. The average position of both these parties (excluding outlying cases) is in the lower left-hand quadrant, on the liberal side of Dimension I and the low emphasis side of Dimension IV. Fianna Fail, on the other hand, and excluding the 1969 case, lies in the upper right-hand quadrant, on the conservative side of Dimension I and the high emphasis side of Dimension IV.

(Figures 4 and 4A about here)

The Labour-Fine Gael alignment vs. Fianna Fail is also evident in Figure 4, which represents the space created by Dimensions I and V. Here Labour and Fine Gael are again overlapping substantially, with Fianna Fail, particularly in the later years, being somewhat separated. It is also interesting to note the different positions of Fine Gael's early and later programmes, a point which is even more evident from Figure 4A. While the average positions of the three parties for the period as a whole might suggest that Fine Gael has more in common with Fianna Fail than with Labour, the separate position shown for the latest

Figure 4: Plot of parties on Dimensions I and V.



Figure 4A: Summary of parties' positions on Dimensions I and V.



Notes: [1] Excludes 1948 & 1957
[2] Excludes 1951

three Fine Gael programmes (1965,1969 and 1981) suggests that Just Society Fine Gael is in fact very similar to post-war Labour. Moreover, the coalition manifestos in this case lie almost exactly half-way between Labour and late Fine Gael, while all three positions are quite removed from that occupied by Fianna Fail. Thus while Fine Gael programmes in general fall on the low emphasis side of the Socialist Economy Dimension, the programmes from the Just Society onwards occupy a position clearly on the Labour side of the divide.

(Figures 5 and 5A about here)

The final figure presented in this context shows the parties' positions in the space created by Dimensions II and V, the one emphasising Capitalist Economics and Irish Unity (identified as the Fine Gael dimension), and the other Socialist Economy (identified as the Labour dimension) - see Figure 5. While all three parties occupy reasonably distinct areas in this space, the contrast between Labour and Fine Gael is particularly striking, especially in the earlier part of the period. The positions are also summarised in Figure 5A, which this time separates all three parties into early and late periods. As can be seen from this Figure, the average postion of each party is quite different if we take the post-war period as a whole. Fianna Fail lies in the lower left-hand quadrant, with a low emphasis on both dimensions; Labour lies in the upper left-hand quadrant, with a low emphasis on Dimension II and a high emphasis on Dimension V, while Fine Gael lies (only marginally) in the lower right-hand quadrant, with a significantly high emphasis on Dimension II and a slightly low emphasis on Dimension V. Finally, the Coalition manifestos lie in the fourth

Figure 5: Plot of parties on Dimensions II and V.



Figure 5A: Summary of parties' positions on Dimensions II and V.



Notes: [1] Labour excludes 1951; Labour (I) includes 1948,1954-1961; Labour (II) includes 1965,1969 & 1981
[2] Fine Gael excludes 1951; Fine Gael (I) includes 1948, 1954-1961; Fine Gael (II) includes 1965,1969 & 1981.
[3] Fianna Fail excludes 1969; Fianna Fail (I) includes 1948-1961; Fianna Fail (II) includes 1965,1977 & 1981.

upper right-hand quadrant, with a high emphasis on both dimensions. On the face of it, therefore, these data on the post-war positions in general would not suggest the presence of an issue basis in the Fine Gael-Labour coalitions.

By breaking the period into two, however, we get a very different picture: Fine Gael(I), representing the position of the 1948,1954,1957 and 1961 manifestos, shifts position significantly to become Fine Gael(II). Labour also moves into the upper-right-hand quadrant in the later years. From 1965 onwards, in fact, we find both parties in very proximate positions, with the coalition manifestos in an intermediate - albeit slightly closer to Fine Gael - location. Thus by breaking the post-war period into two, we find substantive issue-based evidence for the anti-Fianna Fail alliance in the 1970s. Tangentially, it is also interesting to note Fianna Fail's slight shift towards the centre of the space in the latter part of the period.

VII. THE LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION.

The final section which will be treated in this now foreshortened paper concerns the parties' positions on a left-right dimension. As is clear from the previous section, none of the final five factors which have been identified correspond to a straight left-right dimension. To be sure, Dimensions II and V run reasonably close to this, but the former also loads onto pro-Irish unity statements, while the latter alone loads only onto the socialist components of the manifestos and is also the weakest of the five dimensions.

(Table 12 about here)

Given these results, this final section will concern only the Economy domain, analysing the categories in this area in an effort to see if a left-right dimension can be established and, if so, to then identify the positions of the parties along this dimension. Table 12 presents the results of a factor analysis on the categories in the Economy domain only, forcing a one-factor solution in order to extract a single dimension. The results are quite gratifying. The factor loads positively ($\geq$ .5) on Controlled Economy and Nationalisation, with slightly lower but nevertheless still positive loadings on Regulation of Capitalism and Economic Planning. These positive loadings therefore suggest a left pole in the single factor. Moreover, the factor also loads negatively on the classic conservative categories, Enterprise and Economic Orthodoxy, with a slightly lower but still negative loading on Incentives. This in turn suggests that the factor has a right pole. In effect, therefore, the application of a one-factor solution to the Economy domain results in a clear left-right dimension.

The next step is obviously to take the resulting factor scores and to thus position the parties on this dimension. In order to do this, however, it seems advisable to reverse the plus and minus signs of the loadings and therefore also of the factor scores. This change is effected simply in order

Table 12: Economy - One Factor Solution

Categories	Factor Left-Right Dimension
401 Enterprise	-.781
402 Incentives	-.463
403 Regulation of capitalism	.427
404 Economic Planning	.426
406 Protectionism: Positive	-.005
410 Productivity	.371
411 Technology/infrastructure	.019
412 Controlled Economy	.534
413 Nationalisation	.515
414 Economic Orthodoxy	-.581
Eigenvalue	2.21
Percent of variance	22

Categories excluded due to low use:

405 Corporatism
407 Protectionism: Negative
408 Economic goals, policy non-specific
409 Keynsian demand management.

that the resulting plot will correspond to the conventional layout of left-right scales, i.e. having left on the minus side and right on the plus side of the scale. It should be clear that this change does not in any way affect the relative positions of the parties or the side of the left-right scale on which they are located.

(Figure 6 about here)

The average positions of the parties for the post-war period as a whole are shown in Figure 6. Though the scale is relatively short, nevertheless it clearly distinguishes the two coalition parties, Labour and Fine Gael, the one occupying the leftmost position, the other the rightmost position. Fianna Fail occupies almost the exact centre of the dimension. What is also interesting to note is that the two coalition manifestos lie clearly on the Labour - and left - side of the dimension. Given the right-positioning of Fine Gael, the dominant partner in the coalitions, this left location seems at first sight somewhat anomalous. However, if we recall the evidence of Fine Gael's movement along Dimensions II and V as defined in the analysis of all seven domains in the previous section of this paper, then a closer look at the factor scores on the left-right dimension might provide similar evidence of a growing proximity between Fine Gael and Labour.

Figure 7 accordingly plots the movement of all three parties over time along the left-right dimension, the scale of which is correspondingly enlarged in order to accommodate the more extreme positions of individual programmes. It is in this figure that we find clearest evidence of the difference between the early and later periods in post-war Irish politics. With the exception of 1957, when Fianna Fail moved slightly to the left of Labour as it sought to return to Government, all three parties maintain more or less steady positions vis a vis one another from 1948 up to and including 1961: Fine Gael on the right - particularly so in 1951 when defending its record in office, Fianna Fail in the centre, and Labour - erratically - on the left.

Figure 6:

AVERAGE POSITION OF PARTIES ON LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION, 1948-1981.[1]



Note: [1]According to the one factor solution in the Economy domain, Left scores should be positive and Right negative; in order to maintain the conventional layout of such a left-right dimension, however, the signs have been simply reversed. This does not alter the relative positioning of the parties.

(Figure 7 about here)

In 1965 the positions modified: a slight shift to the right by Fianna Fail, and a fairly major shift to the left by the new, Just Society, Fine Gael, left both larger parties occupying almost exactly the same position. This new tendency was even more evident in 1969; though Fine Gael retreated rightwards again, a major shift to the right by Fianna Fail placed that party in its most conservative position since the war, and also meant that, for the first time in this period, both Labour and Fine Gael were on the left of their traditional opponent. In 1973 both parties formed a coalition and campaigned on a joint programme.

Though we have not data for Fianna Fail in the 1973 election, the 1977 picture shows what might almost be a textbook example of the 'waning of opposition', with both Fianna Fail and the coalition occupying much the same position on the left-right dimension. In 1981, when all three parties ran independent campaigns, they reverted to their original pre-1965 positions - Labour on the left, Fine Gael on the right, and Fianna Fail in the centre. This time, however, the distances between the parties had been considerably reduced.

Since the left-right dimension did not clearly emerge from the overall analysis in the previous section, it is difficult to argue that it represents a significant cleavage in post-war Irish politics. Nevertheless, as the analysis in this final section shows, the left-right dimension which was extracted from the Economy domain does provide a picture which is consonant with what we do know of post-war party competition in Ireland. In particular, the movement of the parties along this dimension does suggest a very plausible basis for the Fine Gael-Labour coalitions of 1973 and 1977. And while such an argument could also be advanced concerning the findings in the previous section, it is the positions on this left-right dimension which most effectively predict the 1973 strategy.

Figure 7: MOVEMENT OF PARTIES ON LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION, 1948-1981[1]



Notes:[1] According to the results of the one factor solution, Left scores should be positive and Right scores negative; in order to maintain the conventional layout of such a left-right dimension, however, the signs have simply been reversed. This does not alter the relative positioning of the parties.

Bibliography of Irish 'Manifestoes', 1948-81

Fianna Fail

Year	Manifesto
1948	'Party Leaders on their Programmes, No. 1: Fianna Fail'. Irish Independent, 23.1.1948.
1951	'To the Electors of West Galway'. Leaflet published by Fianna Fail containing the 'Great National Reconstruction Programme'.
1954	'Radio Broadcast by An Tánaiste, Mr. Seán Lemass, on Tuesday, 11th May, 1954' (Dublin: Fianna Fail 1954, mimeo).
1957	'Campaign to Beat Crisis'. Irish Press, 16.2.1957.
1961	'Taoiseach Foresees Change in Population Trend'. Irish Times, 12.8.1961.
1965	'People Will Back Us All the Way Again: Taoiseach'. Irish Press, 17.3.1965.
1969	'Taoiseach Opens F.F. Election Campaign'. Irish Times, 28.5.1969.
1973	'Text of Taoiseach's Statement'. Irish Times, 6.2.1973.
1977	Manifesto: Action Plan for National Reconstruction (Dublin: Fianna Fail, 1977).
1981	Our Programme for the '80s (Dublin: Fianna Fail, 1981).

Fine Gael

Year	Manifesto
1948	'Party Leaders on their Programmes, No. 3: Fine Gael'. Irish Independent, 26.1.1948.
1951	Election leaflet for Dun Laoighaire-Rathdown Constituency.
1954	'Costello Gives 13 Principles'. Irish Press, 3.5.1954.
1957	'Taoiseach Gives 16 Reasons for Supporting Fine Gael'. Irish Times, 1.3.1957.

Fine Gael cont'd.

Year	Manifesto
1961	What Fine Gael Stands For (Dublin: Fine Gael, 1961).
1965	Fine Gael Policy 1965: 'Towards a Just Society' (Dublin: Fine Gael 1965).
1969	Winning Through to a Just Society (Dublin: Fine Gael, 1969).
1973	'Statement of Intent' (Dublin: Fine Gael and the Labour Party, 1973, mimeo).
1977	The National Coalition Government: Achievements. Programme for Progress (Dublin: Fine Gael and the Labour Party, 1977).
1981	A Better Future: Let the Country Win (Dublin: Fine Gael, 1981).

The Labour Party

Year	Manifesto
1948	'Party Leaders on their Programmes, No. 4: Labour'. Irish Independent, 27.1.1948.
1951	'Appendix I: General Election 1951 - Labour Party Manifesto. Labour's Way to Achieve Prosperity and Security' in Administrative Council Report for 1950-51 and 1951-52 (Dublin: the Labour Party, 1952), pp. 52-54.
1954	'More for Social Services, Pensions'. Irish Press, 30.4.1954.
1957	'Appendix I: General Election 1957. Labour Party Election Programme', in Administrative Council Report for 1956-57 (Dublin: the Labour Party, 1957), pp. 26-28.
1961	'More Planning is Labour Aim'. Irish Times, 13.8.1961.
1965	'Labour Election Manifesto'. Irish Times, 24.3.1965.
1969	'Appendix No. 1: 1969 General Election', in Labour Party Annual Report 1969 (Dublin: the Labour Party, 1969), pp. 68-83.

1973 and 1977 as of Fine Gael.

1981	Labour '81: Election Programme (Dublin: The Labour Party, 1981).

FOOTNOTES

1. Clann na Poblachta actually stayed outside the second Coalition Cabinet, though it did pledge its support to the Government. National Labour, which entered the 1948 Cabinet as a separate party before merging once more with Labour in 1950, should also perhaps be included as a relevant party, though it is excluded from this particular analysis.

2. There are archival problems concerning all three parties: Labour's records were apparently stolen when the party moved headquarters; those of Fine Gael - never terribly comprehensive in any case - have been transferred to the Archives Department of University College Dublin but, at least when last checked, had not been properly catalogued; Fianna Fail's records have been stuffed at random into large black plastic rubbish sacks and left in a dusty room in the attic of party headquarters.

3. Jack Lynch, interview, 19 November 1980.

4. Since then, much of the blame for Ireland's cu-rent budget problems have been laid at the door of the Fianna Fail 1977 Manifesto. Indeed, when asked about his party's manifesto in 1981, a Fine Gael spokesman told me that 'we don't have a manifesto. Fine Gael has a programme. Manifesto is a dirty word after the last election'.

5. Jack Lynch, interview, 19 November 1980.

6. Liam Cosgrave, interview, 18 November 1980.

7. Figures supplied by Fine Gael.

8. Jack Lynch, interview, 19 November 1980.

9. Cian O hEigeartaigh, 'Shadow Over Garret's Government', Sunday Tribune 5 July 1981.

10. Or so it is claimed by Brendan Halligan, former General Secretary of the Labour Party (interview, 19 November 1980). Halligan also claims that a similar process occured in Fianna Fail in 1973, in that the commitment to abolish rates was first proposed before the election was called, but that the idea was vetoed by the then Finance Minister, George Colley. In the event, the proposal made a belated and much less credible appearance in the last days of the campaign.

11. The 'quasi-sentence' is chosen as the unit of analysis rather than the 'full' sentence since many of the latter include subclauses which require separate coding. The coding in the Irish case was carried out by the author, and checked with a political scientist familiar with the literature on post-war Irish politics.

12. Percentages are calculated by averaging out the figures for each party, thus allowing each programme equal weight regardless of differences in length.

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